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ABSTRACT 
 
 Belief in free will has meaningful consequences on morally relevant behaviors; 
however, there is limited research identifying a potential mechanism for these effects. 
Two studies explored whether subjective perceptions of knowing one’s “true self” play a 
mediating role in this relationship. Prosociality served as the primary outcome variable 
in these studies. Study 1 tested the hypothesis that attenuating free will beliefs reduces 
people’s true self-knowledge such that they experience and engage in less prosocial 
emotions, intentions, and behavior. Participants completed a free will manipulation, 
measure of true self-knowledge, and their prosocial emotions, intentions, and behavior 
towards different people in need. Study 2 was a short-term motivational intervention 
aimed to augment belief in free will and assessed whether strengthening people’s belief 
in free will increases feelings of true self-knowledge such that people engage in more 
virtuous behaviors. Participants in the free will intervention condition were asked to 
write about experiences where they utilized their free will in vivid detail for three days. 
Belief in free will, true self-knowledge, and prosocial measures were assessed on day 
four. Both studies did not find direct evidence for true self-knowledge as a mediator for 
these effects. The current research highlights the ongoing need to identify potential 
mechanisms for the effect of belief in free will on moral outcomes. Limitations and 
directions for future research are discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION  
 
 In the long run, we shape our lives, and we shape ourselves. The process never 
ends until we die. And the choices we make are ultimately our own responsibility. 
–Eleanor Roosevelt 
 
The existence of free will has been contentious among philosophers, 
psychologists, and even laypersons for centuries. While some theorists have declared 
that free will is nothing more than an illusion (e.g., Wegner, 2004) or the mistaken 
assumption of conscious causation (e.g., Bargh, 2008), many assert that the existence of 
free will is not of utmost importance, but rather the belief in free will is what bears the 
most weight on our thoughts and actions (Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Monroe & Malle, 
2010). Indeed, over the past decade, there have been burgeoning lines of research 
attesting to the importance of believing in free will (see Baumeister & Brewer, 2012, for 
a review). In fact, there has been a large niche of research that has focused extensively 
on the influence of free will beliefs on morally relevant behaviors such as cheating 
(Vohs & Schooler, 2008), aggression (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009), and 
ungratefulness (Mackenzie, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2014). While establishing that free will 
beliefs, in fact, have meaningful consequences on moral behavior, little research has yet 
to empirically demonstrate why this belief influences moral action as well as how 
researchers and practitioners can augment people’s belief in free will in the long term. 
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The current research is designed to address these gaps in literature by investigating a 
potentially important mechanism, perceived true self-knowledge, for this relationship 
and developing an intervention aimed at reliably boosting people’s free will beliefs. The 
present studies specifically test the hypothesis that attenuating free will beliefs will 
reduce people’s subjective experience of knowing their “true self” such that they 
subsequently engage in less moral behaviors. To mitigate these effects, a secondary 
hypothesis examined whether increasing people’s belief in free will makes people feel 
more “in touch” with their true selves and propel them to behave more virtuously. 
Lay Understanding of Free Will 
 While scholars may operationalize free will in different terms, most people 
understand free will as the ability to freely choose their own actions and determine their 
own outcomes (Aarts & van den Bos, 2011; Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Mele, 2006; 
Stillman & Baumeister, 2010). For instance, in an attempt to distinguish between 
scholarly conceptions of free will focused primarily on discussions about causation and 
determinism and ordinary people’s understanding of free will, Monroe and Malle (2010) 
discovered that free will is perceived by laypersons as a choice to behave according to 
one’s desires without internal or external pressures (see also Monroe, Dillon, & Malle, 
2014). Similarly, Stillman, Baumeister, and Mele (2011) sought to examine how 
laypersons differentiate between actions indicative or not indicative of free will. Content 
analyses of autobiographical narratives indicate that behaviors involving action control 
such as goal progress and achievement, conscious evaluation of decisions, and moral 
behaviors reflect acts of free will. More recently, Feldman, Baumeister, and Wong 
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(2014) assessed the link between belief in free will and the concept of choice and found 
a strong cognitive association between the two ideas. More specifically, the more people 
believe in free will, the stronger they associate the experience of choice with freedom. 
Taken together, the feeling that people can freely choose actions among infinite options 
seems to be central to many lay beliefs about free will. 
A complementary perspective of free will is the notion that individuals have the 
opportunity to act in numerous ways in the same situation (Baumeister, Bauer, & Lloyd, 
2010; Mackenzie, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2014). In contrast to the philosophical 
understanding of determinism, which posits that every event is casually inevitable, and 
only one action and one outcome is possible, free will suggests that any set of actions 
could result in different outcomes (Alquist, Ainsworth, Baumeister, Daly, and Stillman, 
2015; Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Mackenzie et al., 2014). Unsurprisingly, belief in free 
will is positively associated with internal locus of control (Paulhus & Carey, 2011; 
Stillman et al., 2011), self-efficacy (Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent, & Lambert, 
2016), and the Big Five traits of conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to 
experience (Stillman et al., 2011). This research suggests that belief in free will is deeply 
intertwined with traits that embody agency and autonomy. In line with these ideas, belief 
in free will is argued to promote willingness to exercise effortful control over one’s 
behavior (Stillman, Baumeister, Vohs, Lambert, Fincham, & Brewer, 2010). Research 
has also found that belief in free will leads people to imagine more counterfactual 
possibilities or how things “might have been” (Alquist et al., 2015). While free will 
indeed encompasses the experience of choice, pivotal to its conceptualization is the 
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ability to engage in many alternative actions that may lead to a multitude of outcomes.  
Belief in Free Will and Moral Responsibility 
 The belief that people have the license to behave infinitely is remarkably 
widespread. A myriad of research has shown that most people believe in free will 
(Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005), and many even believe they have more 
free will than others (Pronin & Kugler, 2011). Moreover, belief in free will is not limited 
to western cultures; in fact, intuitions about free will have been demonstrated cross-
culturally (Sarkissian, Chatterjee, De Brigard, Knobe, Nichols, & Sirker, 2010). The 
prevalence of free will beliefs suggests that it has functional significance and vast 
implications for social attitudes and behavior. This functional significance, according to 
some theorists (e.g., Clark et al., 2014), is a sense of moral responsibility. 
The proposition that free will beliefs serve to hold the self and others personally 
and morally responsible for their behaviors has been empirically supported. For instance, 
Bergner and Ramon (2013) found a strong relationship between belief in free will and 
morality. More specifically, greater belief in free will is associated with the perception 
that morality guides most human behavior and is related to having higher moral 
standards. Belief in free will has also been linked to belief in a just world for others and 
for oneself (Carey & Paulhus, 2013). It seems the affordance of choice inherent in free 
will beliefs suggests that the world is fair and just, and people get what they deserve. In a 
similar vein, people who believe in free will tend to extract more meaningful lessons 
after reflecting on past misdeeds, suggesting that people indeed think about ways they 
could have acted differently and can presumably be more upstanding in the future 
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(Stillman & Baumeister, 2010).  
 The intimate relationship between belief in free will and moral responsibility is 
also echoed in research investigating punitive actions and retribution. Research has 
found that believing in free will increases the severity of punishment toward people who 
commit immoral (Clark et al., 2014; see also Shariff et al., 2014) or criminal acts 
(Paulhus & Carey, 2013). Similarly, when judging the moral actions of a person in a 
hypothetically deterministic universe, people ascribe greater moral responsibility for a 
wrongdoing if they believe people have free will or the ability to do “otherwise” 
(Nahmias et al., 2005; see also Feltz & Cova, 2014; Nichols & Knobe, 2007). In this 
way, perceiving the transgressor’s actions as freely chosen increases the culpability of 
their behavior. Thus, belief in free will is important in assigning moral responsibility and 
serves to justify punishment for less virtuous members of society.  
Belief in Free Will and Immoral Behavior  
If believing in free will instills a sense of moral responsibility, undermining these 
beliefs should provide people with a license to behave unscrupulously. Indeed, an extant 
amount of research has shown that this is the case. In their provocative research on 
disbelief in free will and cheating behaviors, Vohs and Schooler (2008) found that 
temporarily attenuating belief in free will, by exposing people to deterministic 
worldviews, increases dishonesty and encourages cheating. They argue that the absence 
of belief in free will can undermine the self as agent, thereby reducing one’s sense of 
personal responsibility and promoting negative behavior. This influential finding 
inspired more inquiries into the behavioral effects of belief in free will. For instance, 
 6 
 
Baumeister and colleagues (2009) found that inducing disbelief in free will reduces 
prosocial intentions, helping behaviors, and increases aggression towards others. 
Similarly, Stillman and Baumeister (2010) found that disbelief in free will reduces 
volunteerism, and this effect was especially pronounced for individuals high in 
psychopathy. While belief in free will motivates people to behave according to high 
moral standards, disbelief in free will suggests that people have little control and choice 
in their actions, and instead, urges people to behave in more impulsive, automatic ways. 
Without belief in free will guiding behavior, people cannot be held responsible for their 
actions and behave more negatively as a consequence. 
 While not directly classified as immoral behaviors, reducing belief in free will 
has been shown to influence other important psychological phenomenon such as 
conformity (Alquist, Ainsworth, & Baumeister, 2013) and gratitude (MacKenzie et al., 
2014). Research has found that attenuating free will beliefs causes people to lose their 
motivation to exercise self-control and think for themselves, increasing the likelihood 
that they will conform to group norms (Alquist et al., 2013). While the valence of 
conformity is subject to individual interpretation, if normative behavior resembles 
immoral actions, there is a possibility for many downstream consequences of following 
the thoughts and behaviors of others. Moreover, belief in free will is argued to be an 
important component of experiencing gratitude (MacKenzie et al., 2014). MacKenzie 
and colleagues (2014) found that modifying belief in free will changes perceptions of 
motivational sincerity. That is, when people’s belief in free will is reduced, they perceive 
benefactors as having less free will and do not feel as much gratitude for their acts of 
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prosocial behavior. This is particularly important in that free will beliefs can alter 
judgments of one’s moral character.  
 The relationship between belief in free will and morally relevant behaviors 
suggests that people are causal agents in the social world. That is, there is a sense of 
authorship behind each choice or action one makes. Providing a direct test of this 
association, research has found that inducing disbelief in free will attenuates different 
components of self-agency (Lynn, Muhle- Karbe, Aarts, & Brass, 2014). Additionally, 
Aarts and van den Bos (2011) found that belief in free will is strengthened when people 
perceive they are willfully producing chosen outcomes while engaging in goal-directed 
behaviors. They suggest that the “intentional binding” between action and outcome 
produces feelings of self-agency underlying free will beliefs (Aarts & van den Bos, 
2011, p. 533). Furthermore, belief in free is associated with proximal determinants of 
agency such as higher self-efficacy, greater mindfulness, lower levels of perceived life 
stress, and the pursuit of meaningful goals (Crescioni et al., 2016). Overall, these 
findings suggest belief in free will invokes a sense of agency and heightens the 
experience of action control. 
 Personal agency is also often used to explain the many effects of belief in free 
will. For instance, the relationship between disbelief in free will and conformity may be 
due to the fact that undermining the existence of free will causes people to exert less 
effort to think independently; this in turn makes them more vulnerable to social 
influence (Alquist et al., 2013). In other words, attenuating free will beliefs diminishes 
feelings of self-agency, increasing normative behavior. Similarly, one possibility for 
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why people with high free will beliefs generate more counterfactual thoughts about the 
self (Alquist et al., 2015) is that free will greatly contrasts an alternate state of affairs 
with actual reality. Self-focused counterfactuals instill the belief that people can freely 
engage in better decisions and actions in the future. Of particular relevance to the current 
research, agency can help explain the immoral outcomes of disbelieving in free will. As 
previously mentioned, Vohs and Schooler (2008) suggest that the absence of free will 
can undermine the self as agent and create a “‘why bother?’ mentality” such that people 
lose their sense of self-control and engage in unethical behaviors such as cheating (p. 
54). In a similar vein, Baumeister et al. (2009) contend that disbelief in free will 
diminishes self-control and the experience of volition, producing antisocial behaviors 
such as aggression and reduced helpfulness. Taken together, when individuals feel they 
can freely choose their own actions and control the outcomes of a situation, they evoke a 
sense of personal agency that helps them navigate their behaviors in the social world. 
Belief in Free Will and the True Self 
 The belief that one can freely will their actions suggests that the self, as an acting 
agent in the social world, plays a guiding role in behavior. The experience of personal 
agency and causation invoked from free will beliefs suggests that it can influence 
people’s core assumptions about who they are or their “true self” (Newman, De Freitas, 
& Knobe, 2015; Schlegel & Hicks, 2011). The true self is generally understood as a set 
of immutable characteristics and attributes within individuals that influences healthy 
psychological functioning (see Horney, 1950; Jung, 1953; Miller, 1979; Rogers, 1959; 
Winnicott, 1960). Lay theories about the true self suggests that it is a relatively private 
 9 
 
entity that may be separate from one’s behaviors (e.g., Laing, 1960) and may be an 
hidden aspect of one’s self subject to discovery (Schlegel, Vess, & Ardnt, 2012). 
To capture one’s subjective understanding of the true self, researchers have 
focused on the experience of self-alienation or true-self awareness. Self-alienation refers 
to feeling disconnected or “out of touch” with one’s true self (Costas & Fleming, 2009; 
Rokach, 1988; Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & Joseph, 2008). These feelings arise 
when there is a discrepancy between one’s conscious awareness and one’s actual 
experience of thoughts and emotions. True-self awareness reflects one’s trust and 
responsiveness to one’s core or real self (Kernis & Goldman, 2006). This entails the 
acknowledgement of one’s strengths and weaknesses and feeling “in touch” with one’s 
internal motives and desires. Both self-alienation and true-self awareness are vital 
components of the higher order construct of authenticity, conceptualized as the 
unhindered operation of one’s true self in daily life (Wood et al., 2008; Kernis & 
Goldman, 2006). 
 Research is beginning to explore the implications belief in free will has on the 
true self. Recently, Seto and Hicks (2016) discovered that attenuating free will beliefs 
reduces people’s subjective experience of knowing their true self. More specifically, 
people report feeling more alienated from their true selves, less true-self awareness, and 
experienced lowered perceptions of authenticity when their sense of choice and control 
over their actions have been threatened. This relationship can be explained by the same 
personal agency inherent in free will beliefs. Many theoretical perspectives suggest that 
personal agency represents an essential component of one’s identity (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 
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2000). Our sense of self is also thought to emanate from how we ascribe authorship or 
agency to our actions (Wegner, 2003). Because a sense of agency is uniquely tied to the 
self, then lowering belief in free will creates a division between one’s acting agent and 
their true self. Losing a sense of agency is analogous to losing a fundamental aspect of 
our identity, causing people to feel less certain about who they really are. 
 The loss of true self-knowledge when belief in free will is weakened may help 
explain why disbelief in free will has been associated with many immoral or antisocial 
behaviors. It is possible that people are more likely to behave without a sense of moral 
self-regulation when their acting agent is out of touch with their true self. At a 
fundamental level, people believe their true selves are morally good (Newman, Bloom, 
& Knobe, 2014). In fact, research has found that inauthentic behaviors (i.e., behaviors 
that do not reflect one’s true self) incite feelings of immorality (Gino, Kouchaki, & 
Galinsky, 2015). It is plausible that when belief in free will is diminished, and we feel 
that our actions do not embody our true selves, we may act without a sense of moral 
responsibility. That is, reducing belief in free will may remove our true self as a “moral 
compass,” making it more likely to engage in antisocial behaviors. 
The True Self and Immoral Behaviors 
There is an emerging line of research illustrating that moral character is an 
essential component to personal identity. For instance, people are more likely to ascribe 
morally good qualities (e.g., racial equality) to an agent’s true self compared to morally 
bad qualities (e.g., racial discrimination), suggesting that people have a strong tendency 
to believe the true self is fundamentally good (Newman et al., 2015). Similarly, people 
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tend to place more value on moral character traits such as courage, fairness, and honesty 
when making judgments about a person’s identity (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). 
Research has also found that changes to a person’s moral character traits reflect changes 
to a person’s true self more than changes to other characteristics about the self, including 
non-moral personality traits, basic cognitive processes, memories, and 
desires/preferences (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Thus, it seems that moral 
information greatly bears on our evaluations of the self.  
More importantly, research is beginning to explore how the relationship between 
perceptions of the true self and perception of morality influences moral regulation of 
behavior. Recently, Gino, Kouchaki, and Galinsky (2015) found evidence that behaving 
inauthentically (i.e., failing to act in accordance with one’s true self) violates one’s sense 
of morality. When participants recalled instances in which they were untrue to their 
selves, they experienced greater feelings of immorality and impurity and engaged in 
compensatory prosocial behaviors to restore their moral goodness. This is parallel to 
research demonstrating that people are more likely to engage in compensatory helping 
behaviors after recalling unethical deeds (e.g., Lee & Schwartz, 2010a; Zhong & 
Liljenquist, 2006).  
While Gino and colleagues (2015) assessed authenticity as a predictor of moral 
judgment, research by Christy, Seto, Schlegel, Vess, and Hicks (2016) examined moral 
behavior as a predictor of subjective self-knowledge. They found that reflecting on past 
immoral behaviors attenuates current perceptions of self-knowledge such that people 
report feeling less “in touch” with their true selves. These findings are consistent with 
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moral rationalization (see Tsang, 2002), in which people try to uphold their sense of 
moral goodness by justifying their immoral actions. It is possible that people may deny 
self-knowledge after committing immoral acts, as a means of maintaining the belief that 
one’s true self is morally good. Together, this seminal work illustrates the unique 
intersection between the true self and morally relevant behaviors. 
Overall, these findings suggest a strong interface between belief in free will, 
subjective perceptions of the true self, and moral and immoral conduct. Attenuating 
belief in free will has been linked to feeling less in touch with one’s true self (Seto & 
Hicks, 2016) as well as a host of negative outcomes (see Vohs & Schooler, 2008; 
Baumeister et al., 2009). Similarly, true self-knowledge and authenticity are uniquely 
tied to moral and immoral behaviors (Christy et al., 2016; Gino et al., 2015). The current 
research aims to bridge these lines of research together by empirically examining the 
role true self-knowledge plays in the relationship between belief in free will and moral 
and immoral actions. Specifically, this research tests the hypothesis that diminishing free 
will beliefs attenuates people’s perceptions of true self-knowledge such that they 
subsequently engage in less moral behavior.  
The current research will first examine whether the relationship between belief in 
free will and morally relevant behavior is mediated by subjective perceptions of true 
self-knowledge, as illustrated in Figure 1. This mediation model will test the main 
prediction that diminishing free will beliefs reduces true self-knowledge such that 
participants engage in less moral actions. 
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Figure 1. Proposed mediation model. 
Although it is possible that true self-knowledge mediates the relationship 
between belief in free will and morally relevant behaviors, it is also plausible that true 
self-knowledge moderates the relationship between free will beliefs and moral and 
immoral action. Exploratory analysis will test two competing predictions. The first 
prediction is that true self-knowledge interacts with belief in free will to predict immoral 
conduct such that participants reporting less self-knowledge would behave more 
immorally in the low belief in free will condition compared to participants reporting 
greater self-knowledge or in the high belief in free will condition. That is, one’s sense of 
moral responsibility is the least regulated when people’s beliefs about free will are 
threatened and they feel less in touch with their moral, true selves. On the other hand, it 
is possible that participants with less self-knowledge in the high belief in free will 
condition will behave more immorally compared to those with greater self-knowledge or 
in the low free will condition. Perhaps, believing in free will promotes moral 
responsibility only to the extent that people feel close and connected with their moral 
  Belief in Free Will 
 
Morally Relevant 
Behaviors 
True Self-Knowledge 
 14 
 
true selves. Thus, the proposed research will also explore the moderation model 
illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Proposed moderation model 
Overview of the Studies 
Two studies investigated the potential mediating (or moderating) role of the true 
self in the regulation of morally relevant behaviors. The current set of studies focused on 
prosocial emotions, intentions, and behaviors as the primary dependent variable, as 
previous research has already established a link between free will beliefs and helpfulness 
(Baumeister et al., 2009). Additionally, prosocial actions are often used as compensatory 
behaviors following immoral conduct, suggesting that prosociality is a strong example of 
moral behavior (Lee & Schwartz, 2010a; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006).  
Study 1 examined whether manipulating belief in free will influences prosocial 
emotions (e.g., compassion, empathy), intentions (e.g., willingness to donate money and 
willingness to help), and actions (e.g., volunteering for a service project). Study 2 is an 
intervention study aimed at augmenting free will beliefs. Sample sizes for both studies 
were determined as follows: To provide adequate power to detect effect sizes, a sample 
  Belief in Free Will 
 
Morally Relevant 
Behaviors 
True Self-Knowledge 
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size of over 100 participants per cell was determined before data collection based on 
recommendations in the psychological literature (e.g., Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 
2011; VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007). Data collection was terminated after this goal was 
met.1 
Pilot Study 
 A pilot study was conducted to examine whether true self-knowledge mediated 
and/or moderated the relationship between belief in free will and morally relevant 
behaviors. The dependent variable used in the pilot study was a self-report measure of 
prosocial intentions. The pilot study aimed to conceptually replicate research linking 
belief in free will and helpfulness (Baumeister et al., 2009). True self-knowledge was 
assessed using a measure of self-alienation, which refers to the extent to which one feels 
“out of touch” with his or her true self (Wood et al., 2008). Based on the proposed 
mediation model, the main prediction is that diminishing belief in free will gives rise to 
feelings of self-alienation, and in turn, reduces people’s intentions to behave prosocially. 
The exploratory moderation model will test the two competing interaction effects 
described earlier. 
Participants 
Two hundred sixty-two individuals (166 female; Mage = 18.63, SD = .81) 
recruited from the Texas A&M University psychology subject pool participated in a 
                                                
1	  The data collection for Study 2 was terminated before the sample size goal was met due to slow 
recruitment.   
 
2 Seven participants were excluded from analyses for failing to follow instructions for completing the free 
will manipulation (e.g., wrote about how the statements are true instead of false in the low belief in free 
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study for partial completion of course requirements. Participants were predominantly 
white (77%) and non-Hispanic (75%). 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were escorted to a private computer and were informed that they 
would be participating in a study exploring their personality and attitudes. Participants 
completed the measures described below and were debriefed following the end of the 
study.    
Free Will Manipulation. Participants completed the free will manipulation 
developed by Seto and Hicks (2016; see Appendix A). Participants were randomly 
assigned to read a brief description about high or low belief in free will and were 
presented with 10 statements that reflect belief in free will. Participants were asked to 
think about “why these statements are true (false) based on [their] own experiences and 
select a statement from the list below that have proven especially true (false) in [their] 
life,” for high and low belief in free will conditions, respectively. Finally, they described 
how each chosen statement is true (false) based on their own experiences and “think 
about specific examples from [their] life and provide as much detail as possible.” 
Participants selected a total of three statements. 
Participants indicated their agreement with a general belief in free will statement 
(e.g., “People have complete free will.”) taken from the FAD-Plus (Paulhus & Carey, 
2011) as a manipulation check. Responses were made on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Higher scores indicated greater general belief in free will 
(M = 5.21, SD = 1.39). 
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Self-Alienation. Participants completed the self-alienation subscale of The 
Authenticity Scale (Wood et al., 2008; see Appendix B). Responses (e.g., “I feel as if I 
don't know myself very well.”) were made on a 7-point scale (1 = does not describe me 
at all; 7 = describes me very well). A composite score was created by averaging all the 
responses. Higher scores indicated higher self-alienation (M = 2.47, SD = 1.43, α = .91). 
 Prosocial Intentions. Prosocial intentions were assessed using a 30-item 
measure developed by Gaesser and Schacter (2014; see Appendix C). Participants read 
30 scenarios that describe everyday situations of people in need (e.g., lost dog, locked 
out of a house, sudden illness). Then, they rated their willingness to help a person in 
need using a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 = moderately willing, 7 = very willing). A 
composite score was created by averaging all the responses. Higher scores indicated 
greater prosocial intentions (M = 5.43, SD = .93, α = .95). 
Results and Discussion 
To ensure the free will manipulation was successful, an independent samples t-
test was conducted. There were significant differences in general belief in free will 
(t(252) = -3.839, p = .000, 95% CI [-.970, -.312], d = .520). Participants in the high free 
will belief condition reported greater free will beliefs (M = 5.53, SD = 1.23) compared to 
participants in the low free will belief condition (M = 4.89, SD = 1.46). 
An independent samples t-test was also conducted to examine differences in 
prosocial intentions and self-alienation between free will conditions. There was a 
marginally significant difference in prosocial intentions (t(260) = -1.692, p = .092, 95% 
CI [-.419, .032], d = .205). The results were in the predicted direction such that 
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participants in the low belief in free will condition reported less willingness to help 
another person (M = 5.33, SD = .98) compared to participants in the high belief in free 
will condition (M = 5.52, SD = .87). Surprisingly, the difference in self-alienation was 
trending towards significance (t(260) = 1.607, p = .109, 95% CI [-.064, .629], d = .199). 
The results were in the predicted direction such that participants in the low belief in free 
will condition reported greater self-alienation (M = 2.61, SD = 1.46) compared to 
participants in the high belief in free will condition (M = 2.33, SD = 1.39).  
Mediation. Although there was not a traditionally significant difference in 
prosocial intentions and self-alienation between free will conditions, a meditational 
analysis was conducted to examine the indirect effect of condition on prosocial 
intentions through perceived self-alienation. Researchers have argued that the presence 
of a total effect is not a necessary condition for observing significant indirect effects 
through theoretically meaningful mediators (Hayes, 2009; MacKinnon, Lockwood, 
Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011; Shrout & 
Bolger, 2002; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). 
A bootstrapping analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) based on 5,000 resamples 
tested whether the indirect effect of the condition on prosocial intentions through self-
alienation was significantly different from zero. Unfortunately, the 95% CI for the 
indirect effect contained zero [-.009, .069], indicating that the indirect effect of condition 
on prosocial intentions through perceived self-alienation was not significant. 
Moderation. To examine the influence of self-alienation and free will condition 
on prosocial intentions, a hierarchical regression equation was computed. Self-alienation 
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was standardized, the free will condition was dummy-coded (0 = low free will condition; 
1 = high free will condition), and the product of these variables was used as the 
interaction term (Aiken & West, 1993). The main effect of free will condition marginally 
predicted prosocial intentions (β = .169, p = .139), and self-alienation significantly 
predicted prosocial intentions (β = -.122, p = .034) on the first step of the regression 
equation (R2 change = .028, p = .025). The self-alienation × free will condition 
interaction entered on the second step was significant (β = -.271, p = .018; R2 change = 
.021). Simple slope analyses revealed that self-alienation significantly predicted 
prosocial intentions in the high belief in free will condition (β = -.264, p = .001), but not 
in the low belief in free will condition (β = .006, p = .935). Thus, participants with 
greater self-alienation in the high free will condition reported less prosocial intentions 
compared to those with less self-alienation or in the low free will condition. Results are 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Prosocial intentions as a function of free will condition and self-alienation in 
the pilot study. Predicted values are plotted at ± 1 SD from the mean of self-alienation.  
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CHAPTER II 
STUDY 1 
 
The findings from the pilot study provide preliminary evidence that true self-
knowledge plays an important role in the relationship between free will beliefs and 
moral conduct. Although the difference in prosocial intentions between conditions was 
not significantly mediated by self-alienation, there is initial support for the moderating 
role of self-alienation. Interestingly, participants with greater self-alienation in the high 
belief in free will condition reported less prosocial intentions compared to those with 
less self-alienation or in the low belief in free will condition. This suggests that greater 
belief in free will increases prosocial intentions only to the extent that people feel closer 
and more “in touch” with their true selves. 
 Although the pilot study offers preliminary support for true self-knowledge as a 
potential mechanism between belief in free will and morally relevant behaviors, it is 
important to note two limitations. First, the lack of traditional statistical significance for 
self-alienation was unexpected. In previous research, attenuating belief in free will has 
demonstrated a robust effect on self-alienation (see Seto & Hicks, 2016). However, the 
effect size for the differences in self-alienation between conditions is comparable to 
previous studies, suggesting that this general effect is not necessarily due to chance. 
Additionally, the short hypothetical stories depicting people in need may not have been 
the strongest measure of prosocial intentions. Although the stories were diverse and 
adapted from various sources of online media, some items did not provide adequate 
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variability in helpfulness. For instance, items such as “A person’s child is a weak 
swimmer, and is struggling to swim back to shore” or “A person is suffering from 
dementia and is lost in a mall” had particularly high levels of willingness to help 
whereas items such as “During a snowstorm, a person is sitting in a nearby airport when 
they find out their scheduled flight home for the holidays has been cancelled” may be 
geographically-specific and subject to lower prosocial intentions. The prosocial 
intentions measure may also be less personally relevant than other measures. That is, the 
stories are relatively ambiguous and do not provide a clear indication of direct helping 
behavior (e.g., “giving money to a homeless person”). These limitations will be 
addressed in Study 1.  
The goal of Study 1 was to develop a better test of the hypothesis by using a 
stronger measure of prosocial intentions. Specifically, participants read ostensible 
autobiographies of members of their local community in a situation of need. A member 
of the local community was chosen to make the helping scenario more potentially 
relevant to the participant. This is similar to helping paradigms in which participants are 
asked to help a fellow college student and have been used in classic studies of helping 
behavior (e.g., Batson et al., 1997). In addition to a new measure of prosocial intentions, 
Study 1 also examined whether prosocial emotions such as compassion and empathy and 
specifically prosocial behavior are influenced by free will beliefs and perceived true self-
knowledge. Prosocial emotions can be an important indication of moral character and 
have not been empirically examined in previous research. Previous research has also yet 
to explore the effect of belief in free will on actual prosocial behavior. Finally, Study 1 
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tested two alternative mediators and/or moderators: self-control and personal agency. 
Previous research suggests that self-control (Baumeister et al., 2009) and personal 
agency (Alquist et al., 2011) explain the influence of disbelief in free will on moral 
outcomes, yet these proposed variables have never been empirically tested.  
 Based on the proposed mediation model, it is expected that reducing people’s 
free will beliefs will attenuate true self-knowledge such that people report less prosocial 
emotions, intentions, and behavior. The moderation model will also be tested. Both 
models will additional assess self-control and agency as potential mediators and/or 
moderators of the proposed relationship between belief in free will and prosociality. 
Pilot Study of Helping Scenarios 
Before conducting Study 1, a pilot study was administered to ensure the helping 
scenarios elicit variability in helpfulness.  
Participants 
Twenty undergraduate research assistants were recruited from the researcher’s 
laboratory to complete the pilot study for the prosocial dependent measures. The 
research assistants were unaware of the study’s true purpose. They read 10 short stories 
about individuals in a variety of situations that potentially need help and completed 
measures of prosocial emotions and intentions described below (see Appendix G). Out 
of the 10 helping scenarios, 3 scenarios eliciting moderate levels in prosocial intentions 
were chosen for the study.  
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Materials and Procedure 
Compassion. Compassion was assessed using 2 items. Participants indicated 
how much compassion they felt “towards [the actor] and [his or her] situation.” They 
were also asked to “imagine that [the actor] was someone who lived in your town” and 
to what extent would they “offer [the actor] emotional support.” Responses were made 
on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 4 = moderately; 7 = very much). Both items were 
averaged together to create a composite compassion score (M = 5.36, SD = .75, α = .90). 
Empathy. Empathy was assessed using 2 items. Participants indicated how much 
empathy they felt “towards [the actor] and [his or her] situation” and to what extent does 
“thinking about [the actor’s] situation” makes them feel sad or concerned. Responses 
were made on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 4 = moderately; 7 = very much). Both items 
were averaged together to create a composite empathy score (M = 5.26, SD = .88, α = 
.93). 
Prosocial Intentions to Donate. Prosocial intentions to donate money were 
assessed using 1 item. Participants were asked to imagine they have $50 and whether 
they would “keep the $50” for themselves or “donate part or all of the money to [the 
actor].” Participants indicated the exact amount of money they were willing to donate to 
the actor in the scenario. Higher scores indicated greater intentions to donate money (M 
= 26.73, SD = .87, α = .94).  
Prosocial Intentions to Help. Prosocial intentions to help were assessed using 1 
item. Participants indicated “how likely” they would be willing “to help [the actor] in 
this situation.” Responses were made on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 4 = moderately; 7 
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= very much). Higher scores indicated greater prosocial intentions to help (M = 4.97, SD 
= .87, α = .83). 
Prosocial Behavior. Prosocial behavior was assessed using 1 item. Participants 
were asked to imagine they had “a real opportunity to help [the actor].” They were asked 
if they would volunteer to help the actor and “how many hours in one week” they would 
be willing to spend helping the actor. Higher scores indicated greater number of hours 
volunteered (M = 4.72, SD = 2.03, α = .91). 
Results 
Prosocial Scenarios. To determine the scenarios used for the study, each of the 
10 scenarios were ranked according to least prosocial intention to most prosocial 
intention based on their mean responses. Three prosocial scenarios were adapted based 
on the middle rankings: 1.) Intention to help a teacher at a school district with low 
funding 2.) Intention to help the founder of a meal delivery organization maintain his 
business 3.) Intention to help an individual who has suffered physical injuries and 
financial difficulties from a car accident. See Table 1 for the means.
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Table 1. Items used in pilot study, ranked from least to most prosocial intention based on 
mean responses.  
Prosocial Intention Mean (SD) 
1. Bob Houseman’s local business is in danger of bankruptcy because a 
major corporation recently opened in his town. He keeps losing customers 
from the competition and is worried he will lose his business and sole 
source of income. 
4.33 (1.24) 
2. Edith Jones’ house was recently broke into by burglars. All of her 
family’s valuables were stolen including the new computers she bought 
for her children to use for school. 
4.33 (1.74) 
3. Chelsea Johnson is a single mother of three children and has recently 
decided to go back to college to finish her bachelor’s degree. 
Unfortunately, she did not receive any financial aid for school and does 
not know how she will be able to pay for college. 
4.62 (1.16) 
4. Annie Davidson lost her job at a company she has been with for 25 
years due to budget cuts. She was only a few years from retirement and 
has lost her entire pension. She is currently having difficulty finding 
another job. 
5.05 (1.63) 
5. John Matthews is a teacher at a school district with low funding. Each 
month, he uses a significant amount of his paycheck to pay for basic 
necessities such as textbooks for each of his students, but now he is 
running into his own financial difficulties. 
5.10 (1.41) 
6. Matt Taylor is the founder of an organization that delivers free meals to 
people in need around the community. His organization is currently low 
on financial resources, and he is unable to pay his drivers for their work. 
5.10 (1.41) 
7. George Thompson was in a car accident that left him with physical 
injuries as well as extensive damages to his car. His current salary is not 
enough to cover the costs of both the car repairs and his hospital bills. 
5.14 (1.59) 
8. Michael Jones’ neighborhood recently suffered from massive flooding. 
His car has severe water damage and needs extensive repairs. Michael is 
the sole source of income for his family and needs the car repaired as soon 
as possible, so he can return to work. 
5.24 (1.14) 
9. Jordan Carson was diagnosed with a rare medical condition and wants 
to complete several medical trials to see if it would help improve her 
health. The medical trials are expensive, and her insurance is not able to 
cover the costs. 
5.29 (1.27) 
10. Karen Blakenship lost her home when a natural disaster hit her house 
unexpectedly. While she is working hard to restore the damage, Karen is 
having difficulty balancing the costs of staying in a hotel and paying for 
the repairs to her house. 
5.57 (1.12) 
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Method 
Participants  
Two hundred and six participants2 were recruited from the psychology subject 
pool at Texas A&M University (148 female, 3 unreported; Mage = 18.62, SD = 1.84).  
Materials and Procedures 
Participants were escorted to a private computer and were informed that they 
would be participating in two unrelated studies. They were told the first study examined 
their personality and individual beliefs, and the second study is a department wide 
survey assessing their perceptions about the Bryan/College Station (B/CS) community 
where the university is centrally located. Participants completed the measures described 
below and were debriefed following the completion of both studies.  
Free Will Manipulation. Participants completed the same free will manipulation 
and general belief in free will manipulation check item (M = 5.17, SD = 1.51) described 
in the pilot study (Seto & Hicks, 2016). Participants completed a second manipulation 
check item assessing personal belief in free will (“I have complete free will.”) from the 
Free Will and Determinism Scale (Rakos, Laurene, Skala, & Slane, 2008; see Appendix 
A). The second manipulation check item was administered to ensure that participants’ 
belief in free will applies to themselves as well as others. This item used a 7-point scale 
(1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Higher scores indicated greater personal 
belief in free will (M = 5.86, SD = 1.28). 
                                                
2 Seven participants were excluded from analyses for failing to follow instructions for completing the free 
will manipulation (e.g., wrote about how the statements are true instead of false in the low belief in free 
will condition), leaving 199 individuals in the final sample. The effect of the main analyses remains 
unchanged when these participants were included. 
  
 
 
27 
Self-Alienation. Self-alienation was assessed using the same 4-item self-
alienation subscale of the Authenticity Scale (Wood et al., 2008) described in the pilot 
study (M = 2.38, SD = 1.43, α = .90). 
Self-Control. Self-control was assessed using the Self-Control Scale (Tangney, 
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004; see Appendix D). Participants indicated their agreement on 
10 statements (e.g., “I refuse things that are bad for me, even if they are fun.”) using a 7-
point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Higher scores indicated greater 
self-control (M = 4.26, SD = 1.01, α = .82). 
Personal Agency. Personal agency was assessed using the Involunariness 
Subscale of the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (Polito, Barnier, & Woody, 2013; see 
Appendix E). Participants indicated their agreement on 5 statements (e.g., “My 
experiences and actions are under my control.”) using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Higher scores indicated greater personal agency (M = 
5.44, SD = .81, α = .71). 
Prosociality. Participants were told about a new organization at their university 
called, “Aggies Helping Texans” (see Appendix F). This student organization offers 
financial aid and other forms of assistance to people living in their local community who 
have endured particular hardships. They are further told that Aggies Helping Texans is 
hoping to develop a recognized philanthropic initiative in the community and that the 
Psychology and Economics Departments are creating an impact report to help them 
acquire their local initiative. To build their impact report, participants were asked to read 
about three members of the local community currently in need of assistance and evaluate 
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their attitudes towards these people. Participants read three short autobiographies of 
hardship adapted from the three scenarios chosen from the pilot study. Then, participants 
completed similar measures of compassion (M = 5.40, SD = .92, α = .82), empathy (M = 
5.14, SD = .96, α = .83), prosocial intentions to donate (M = 22.78, SD = 12.71, α = .71), 
and prosocial intentions to help (M = 4.97, SD = 1.13, α = .74) described in the pilot 
study. The measures were averaged across all three helping scenarios and used in 
subsequent analyses. 
After completing the measures of prosocial emotions and intentions, participants 
indicated whether they would be willing to provide their name and email address to 
volunteer to help one of the members of the community with their particular hardship. 
Two prosocial behavioral measures were assessed. Providing their email address for 
further contact served as the first behavioral dependent measure (49 participants opted to 
volunteer). Participants who provided their email address were also asked “how many 
hours” they would be willing to help their selected community member in the next week 
(M = 2.49, SD = 1.44, α = .99; see Appendix H). At the end of the week, participants 
who provided their email address received an email from the Aggies Helping Texans 
organization asking for a specific favor for a community member. The second behavioral 
dependent measure was whether students would respond to the email indicating a 
commitment to volunteer at a specific time and day (see Appendix I).  
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Results and Discussion 
 
Preliminary Analysis  
An independent samples t-test revealed a significant difference in general free 
will beliefs (t(197) = 2.122, p = .035, 95% CI [.032, .871], d = .307) and personal belief 
in free will (t(197) = 2.670, p = .008, 95% CI [.124, .828], d = .382) such that 
participants in the high belief in free will condition reported greater general (M = 5.35, 
SD = 1.49) and personal free will beliefs (M = 6.09, SD = 1.26) than participants in the 
low belief in free will condition (M = 4.89, SD = 1.51, for general FWB; 5.61, SD = 
1.25, for personal FWB). Thus, the manipulation of free will beliefs was successful. See 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Manipulation check items illustrating differences in belief in free will by 
condition in Study 1. Standard errors are represented by the error bars. 
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alienation between FWB conditions (t(197) = -1.170, p = .243, 95% CI [-.641, .164], d = 
-.166). However, participants in the low FWB condition reported greater self-alienation 
(M = 2.54, SD = 1.53) compared to participants in the high FWB condition (M = 2.30, 
SD = 1.35) as predicted. There was also not a significant difference with reports of self-
control (t(176) = .963, p = .337, 95% CI [-.145, .423], d = .137; equal variances not 
assumed), although the findings were in the predicted direction such that participants 
writing about experiences with high FWB reported greater self-control (M = 4.31, SD = 
.87) than participants writing about experiences with lower FWB (M = 4.18, SD = 1.13). 
Finally, there were significant differences in agency (t(197) = 2.362, p = .019, 95% CI 
[.044, .492], d = .336) with participants in the high FWB condition reporting greater 
feelings of agency (M = 5.55, SD = .86) than participants in the low FWB condition (M 
= 5.28, SD = .74). 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to examine differences in prosocial 
emotions, intentions, and behavior between conditions. There were no significant 
differences in compassion (t(194) = -.423, p = .672, 95% CI [-.313, .202], d = -.061), 
empathy (t(194) = -.457, p = .648, 95% CI [-.334, .209], d = -.065), prosocial intentions 
to donate money (t(194) = -1.301, p = .195, 95% CI [-5.938, 1.218], d = -.186), and 
prosocial intentions to help (t(194) = -.220, p = .826, 95% CI [-.355, .284], d = -.032). 
Participants reported similar feelings of compassion (M = 5.43, SD = .90) and empathy 
(M = 5.17, SD = .90) in the low FWB condition and the high FWB condition (M = 5.38, 
SD = .93, for compassion; M = 5.11, SD = 1.02, for empathy). Participants reported 
greater intentions to donate (M = 24.00, SD = 13.46) in the low FWB condition 
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compared to the high FWB condition (M = 21.64, SD = 11.92), although this difference 
was trending towards significance. Finally, participants reported similar intentions to 
help (M = 4.99, SD = 1.08) to help members of the B/CS community in the low FWB 
condition and the high FWB condition (M = 4.95, SD = 1.18).  
After completing these measures on prosocial emotions and intentions, 
participants were asked if they were willing to sign-up to help the community members 
next week and how many hours they would be willing to volunteer for. Forty-nine 
participants provided their email addresses (26 in the high FWB condition and 23 in the 
low FWB condition). Participants in the high FWB condition reported greater 
willingness to volunteer more hours (M = 2.84, SD = 1.67) than participants in the low 
FWB condition (M = 2.09, SD = 1.04), although the difference was marginal (t(47) = 
1.868, p = .068, 95% CI [-.058, 1.563], d = .542). These results should be interpreted 
with caution due to the small sample size. 
Finally, a second behavioral measure of prosociality was included in which 
participants who provided their email address to volunteer were contacted about specific 
time and days they would be available to help these community members. However, due 
to the small sample size in response rate (N = 1), analyses were not conducted. 
Correlations  
Although there were no significant differences across condition for the primary 
mediator of interest and each of the prosociality measures, correlational analyses were 
conducted to examine the relationship between free will beliefs and each of the proposed 
mediators and measures of prosociality. Across conditions, there were significant 
  
 
 
32 
negative relationships between general and personal belief in free will and self-alienation 
(r(197) = -.209, p = .003, for general FWB; r(197) = -.263 p = .000, for personal FWB), 
suggesting the greater belief in free will, the less feeling of self-alienation. Additionally, 
there were significant positive associations between each of the belief in free will 
measures and agency (r(197) = .381, p = .000, for general FWB; r(197) = .436, p = .000, 
for personal FWB). This relationship suggests that greater free will beliefs are associated 
with greater feelings of personal agency. Importantly, there were significant positive 
correlations between general and personal belief in free will and compassion (r(194) = 
.231, p = .001, for general FWB; r(194) = .190, p = .008, for personal FWB), empathy 
(r(194) = .164, p = .022, for general FWB), and prosocial intentions to help (r(194) = 
.237, p = .001, for general FWB; r(194) = .208, p = .004, for personal FWB). These 
relationships suggest that greater belief in free will is associated with greater prosocial 
emotions and intentions. See Table 2 for correlations among all variables.  
 
Table 2. Bivariate correlations among variables in Study 1 across conditions. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. General FWB -          
2. Personal FWB .672** -         
3. Self-Alienation -.209** -.263** -        
4. Self-Control -.018  .041 -.459** -       
5. Agency .381**  .436** -.306** .172* -      
6. Compassion .231**  .190** -.169* .093 .222** -     
7. Empathy .164*  .126† -.154* .110 .201** .791** -    
8. Intention to Donate .114  .076 -.022 .116  -.001 .488** .440** -   
9. Intention to Help .237**  .208** -.163* .130†  .242** .751** .699** .632** -  
10. Volunteer Hours -.104 -.009 -.002 .021 .340* .135 .250† .028 .187 - 
Note. †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01 
 
Mediation  
Although there were no traditionally significant differences in each of the 
prosociality measures and self-alienation between belief in free will conditions, a 
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meditational analysis was conducted to examine the indirect effect of condition on each 
of the prosociality measures through perceived self-alienation. The same bootstrapping 
analyses from the pilot study were conducted. Unfortunately, the 95% CI for the indirect 
effect contained zero for compassion [-.091, .020], empathy [-.086, .020], prosocial 
intentions to donate [-.537, .341], prosocial intentions to help [-.104, .025], and hours 
willing to volunteer to help members of the local community [-.289, .453], indicating 
that the indirect effect of condition on each of the prosocial measures through perceived 
self-alienation were not significant. 
A meditational analysis was also conducted to examine the indirect effect of 
condition on each of the prosociality measures through self-control. The 95% CI for the 
indirect effect contained zero for each of these measures (95% CIs [-.053, .023] for 
compassion, [-.055, .023] for empathy, [-.834, .315] for prosocial intentions to donate, [-
.074, .028] for prosocial intentions to help, [-.142, .212] for hours willing to volunteer, 
respectively). Thus, the indirect effect of condition on each of the prosocial measures 
through perceived self-control was not significant.   
Finally, the indirect effect of condition on each of the prosociality measures 
through personal agency was examined. The 95% CI for the indirect effect did not 
contain zero for compassion [-.144, -.006], empathy [-.142, -.002], prosocial intentions 
to help [-.193, -.009], and hours willing to volunteer to help members of the community 
[-.692, -.037], suggesting that the indirect effect of the condition on prosociality through 
perceived agency was significant. Thus, the difference in prosocial emotions and 
intentions to help by condition was statistically mediated by differences in perceived 
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agency. The indirect effect of condition on prosocial intentions to donate money through 
perceived agency was not significant (95% CI [-.704, .860]). 
Moderation  
To examine the influence of self-alienation and free will condition on each 
dependent measure, the same hierarchical regression equation from the pilot study was 
computed. Surprisingly, the self-alienation × free will condition interaction was not 
significant for each of the prosociality measures (p’s > .163).  
To examine whether self-control moderated the relationship between belief in 
free will and each of the prosociality measures, a similar hierarchical regression was 
computed. There was a significant self-control × free will condition interaction for 
compassion (β = .319, p = .016; R2 change = .030). There was also a significant self-
control × free will condition interaction for empathy (β = .281, p = .044; R2 change = 
.021). Simple slope analyses revealed that self-control significantly predicted 
compassion (β = .231, p = .015) and empathy (β = .235, p = .019) in the low belief in 
free will condition, but not in the high belief in free will condition (β = -.088, p = .336, 
for compassion; β = -.046, p = .635, for empathy). Participants with greater self-control 
in the low belief in free will condition reported more compassion and empathy compared 
to those with less self-control or in the high belief in free will condition. See Figures 5 
and 6. There were no significant self-control × free will condition interactions for 
prosocial intentions to donate, prosocial intentions to help, and hours willing to 
volunteer (p’s > .608). 
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Figure 5. Compassion as a function of free will condition and self-control in Study 1. 
Predicted values are plotted at ± 1 SD from the mean of self-control. 
 
 
Figure 6. Empathy as a function of free will condition and self-control in Study 1. 
Predicted values are plotted at ± 1 SD from the mean of self-control. 
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Finally, hierarchical regressions were computed to examine whether agency 
moderated the relationship between belief in free will and each of the prosociality 
measures. The agency × free will condition interaction was not significant for any of the 
prosociality measures (p’s > .140).  
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CHAPTER III 
STUDY 2 
 
 Although Study 1 did not provide direct evidence of a mediating or moderating 
effect of true self-knowledge on the effect of belief in free will on prosociality, 
correlational evidence suggests that greater belief in free will is associated with more 
prosocial intentions. Notably, feeling “in touch” with one’s true self is also associated 
with greater willingness to help others. 
Analyses of competing mediators revealed that feelings of personal agency 
mediated the relationship between belief in free will and many of the prosociality 
measures. This suggests that a sense of agency inherent in free will beliefs may drive 
people to engage in helping behaviors. Personal agency is generally understood as the 
feeling that one’s actions are derived from one’s self (Polito et al., 2003) and has been 
implicated as the mechanism driving the influence of disbelief in free will on social 
behaviors such as conformity (Alquist et al., 2011). Perhaps, it is the case that believing 
that one has the ability to choose their actions and the recognition that these actions are 
indeed self-generated that lead to positive moral outcomes.   
Moreover, results from Study 1 also suggest that individual differences in self-
control moderated the effect of belief in free will on prosocial emotions. Specifically, 
participants with high self-control experiencing low belief in free will reported greater 
feelings of compassion and empathy towards others. This may be explained in part by 
research suggesting that mood regulation often constitutes as acts of self-control 
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(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). It is possible that experiencing prosocial emotions 
involves overriding the dominant response to think about one’s self. In fact, Fennis 
(2011) contends that perspective taking, the act of imagining the world from another’s 
viewpoint, is an active form of self-regulation and has found that ego depletion 
diminishes the prosocial effects of perspective taking. It is possible that people who have 
a greater ability to exert self-control, yet recognize that they do not always have the 
ability to dictate their outcomes in life are better able to draw on their moral 
responsibility to think about other people’s welfare. Perhaps, individual differences in 
self-control enhance other-focused emotions. 
The primary goal of Study 2 is to augment people’s belief in free will such that 
they feel more “in touch” with their true selves and behave in a more virtuous manner. A 
free will intervention was developed in which participants were asked to vividly recall 
specific experiences involving the use of free will in their lives. The same measure of 
prosocial intentions was used from Study 1. In Study 2, the measure of prosocial 
behavior was modified to reflect participants’ commitment to helping on general 
volunteer opportunities as opposed to specific service projects used in Study 1. This 
change was made to reduce the potential floor effects of prosocial behavior from the first 
study. It may be the case that participants were less willing to volunteer for the specific 
service projects due to circumstances out of their control (e.g., no car to help with food 
deliveries). Thus, the volunteer opportunities were more open-ended in this study. 
Additionally, this study assessed short-term prosocial behavior and long-term prosocial 
behavior. Short-term prosocial behavior was assessed through the number of participants 
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willing to provide their email addresses and the number of hours they would be available 
to volunteer. Similar to Study 1, this was assessed at the conclusion of the study. To 
measure long-term prosocial behavior, participants were contacted two weeks later to 
see if they would follow through with their volunteerism when a service project arose. 
Study 2 also included exploratory dependent measures of conformity, gratitude, 
and moral identity to test the effectiveness of the free will intervention. Previous 
research has found that disbelief in free will increases conformity (Alquist et al., 2011) 
and reduces feelings of gratitude (MacKenzie et al., 2014). Using the same self-report 
measures of conformity and gratitude from previous studies, Study 2 explored whether 
augmenting free will beliefs reduces conformity and increases gratitude. True self-
knowledge was assessed as the potential mechanism while self-control and personal 
agency were evaluated as alternative mediators and/or moderators. Finally, a measure of 
moral identity was included as another indication of changing self-evaluations. 
Method 
Participants 
One-hundred and forty-two participants3 were recruited from the psychology 
subject pool at Texas A&M University (94 female, 1 gender fluid, 23 unreported; Mage = 
18.61, SD = .88).  
Participants were recruited through a pre-screening process. At the beginning of 
the semester, participants completed a battery of questionnaires including a measure of 
                                                
3 Twenty-six participants were excluded from the final analyses for the inability to complete the full three-
day intervention, leaving 116 participants in the final sample. When analyses were conducted with the 
entire sample, the results remain unchanged. 
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belief in free will from the FAD-Plus Scale (Paulhus & Carey, 2011; see Appendix N). 
Participants indicated their agreement with each statement on a 7-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Responses for the free will subscale (e.g., People 
have complete control over the decisions they make.”) were averaged across items to 
produce a composite free will score. Higher scores indicated greater belief in free will 
(M = 5.24, SD = 1.03, α = .62). Participants who scored below the mean (M = 5.24) were 
recruited for the study. 
Materials and Procedures 
Participants were informed that they would be participating in a study of memory 
in which they would be asked to describe vivid memories of everyday experiences. 
Participants completed the measures described below and were debriefed following the 
completion of the study. 
Free Will Intervention. Participants were randomly assigned to the free will 
intervention or control group (see Appendix J). Participants were told researchers are 
interested in studying people’s memory of everyday experiences. For the next few days, 
they were given writing prompts and asked to describe their memory of everyday 
experiences with as much detail as possible. In the free will intervention condition, 
participants were asked to write about specific experiences involving their demonstration 
of free will in their lives. They were provided with a new writing prompt each day, 
adapted from the statements used in the free will manipulation by Seto and Hicks (2016). 
In the control condition, participants were asked to describe ordinary, everyday 
experiences such as a walk. 
  
 
 
41 
Participants completed the intervention online each day for three consecutive 
days. Three days were chosen based on previous research demonstrating that expressive 
writing for as little as 2 minutes each day for 2 days can be effective in altering 
outcomes such as physical health (Burton & King, 2008). Each day, an email was sent to 
participants in the morning containing a link to the instructions for the day’s prompt. The 
link remained open to participants until midnight. 
On the fourth day, participants completed the free will subscale of the FAD-Plus 
(M = 4.78, SD = .78, α = .70) and same measures of self-alienation (M = 2.83, SD = 
1.47, α = .90), self-control (M = 4.17, SD = .94, α = .83), agency (M = 5.09, SD = .65, α 
= .58), prosocial intentions to donate (M = 22.51, SD = 12.42, α = .86), and prosocial 
intentions to help (M = 4.65, SD = 1.16, α = .74) as Study 1. See Appendix K for the 
cover story. 
Prosocial Behavior. A similar measure of prosocial behavior was adapted from 
Study 1. Participants were asked if they would be willing to help with philanthropy 
projects in the Bryan/College Station community. Instead of having participants sign-up 
for specific projects as in Study 1, participants were told they had a variety of service 
opportunities to choose from (see Appendix L). Participants were given an opportunity 
to provide their email address to be contacted about service projects (26 participants 
provided email addresses). This served as the short-term prosocial behavior measure. 
Additionally, participants who provided their emails were asked to indicate how many 
hours they would be willing to volunteer during the course of the semester. Responses 
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were made on a 20-point scale (0 = 0 hours; 20 = 20 hours). Higher scores indicated 
more hours willing to volunteer (M = 8.55, SD = 5.46).  
As a measure of long-term prosocial behavior, participants who provided their 
emails were contacted two weeks later informing them that two service opportunities 
have arisen (see Appendix M). They were given the opportunity to participate in a 
clothing donation drive or help host a fundraiser for two separate philanthropy 
organizations. Participants interested in volunteering were asked how many hours they 
would be willing to volunteer for these organizations in the next three weeks.  
Conformity. Participants completed an 11-item measure of conformity 
(Mehrabian & Stefl, 1995; see Appendix O). Responses (e.g., “I don’t give in to others 
easily.”) were made on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). 
Responses were averaged across items to produce a composite conformity score. Higher 
scores indicated greater conformity (M = 3.74, SD = .66, α = .65). 
Gratitude. Participants completed a 6-item Gratitude Questionnaire 
(McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002; see Appendix P). Responses (e.g., “When I 
look at the world, I don’t see much to be grateful for (reverse-coded).”) were made on a 
7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Responses were averaged 
across items to produce a composite gratitude score. Higher scores indicated greater 
gratitude (M = 5.45, SD = .99, α = .82). 
Moral Identity Internalization. Participants completed the 5-item 
internalization subscale of The Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002; see 
Appendix Q). This subscale assessed the extent to which someone possesses nine moral 
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traits (e.g., caring, compassionate, fair). Participants indicated their agreement with each 
statement (e.g., “Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of 
who I am.”) on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Responses 
were averaged across items to produce a composite moral identity internalization score. 
Higher scores indicated greater moral identity internalization (M = 5.45, SD = .51, α = 
.85). 
Results and Discussion 
 
Pre-Intervention  
An independent samples t-test did not indicate a significant difference in free will 
beliefs between the free will intervention and control group before the intervention was 
introduced (t(97) = 1.458, p = .148, 95% CI [-.068, .447], d = .27; equal variances not 
assumed). Participants in the free will intervention (M = 4.35, SD = .81) and control 
group (M = 4.54, SD = .56) reported similar baseline levels of free will beliefs at the 
beginning of the study. See Figure 7. 
Post-Intervention  
Unexpectedly, an independent samples t-test did not reveal a significant 
difference in free will beliefs after the free will intervention was introduced (t(114) = 
.230, p = .819, 95% CI [-.258, .325], d = .04). Participants reported similar levels of free 
will beliefs in the free will intervention (M = 4.78, SD = .88) and the control group (M = 
4.82, SD = .70). See Figure 8. 
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Figure 7. Differences in belief in free will by condition in Study 2 at pre-intervention. 
Standard errors are represented by the error bars. 
 
 
Figure 8. Differences in belief in free will by condition in Study 2 at post-intervention. 
Standard errors are represented by the error bars. 
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To determine the effectiveness of the free will intervention temporally, a 
dependent samples t-test examined whether free will beliefs differed before and after the 
intervention. The results indicated an increase in free will beliefs (t(56) = -3.264, p = 
.002, 95% CI [-.692, -.166], d = .51) such that participants reported higher free will 
beliefs after the free will intervention (M = 4.78, SD = .88) compared to the recruitment 
period (M = 4.35, SD = .81). However, there was a similar effect for participants in the 
control condition (t(59) = -2.918, p = .005, 95% CI [-.461, -.086], d = .43). Again, 
participants reported higher free will beliefs (M = 4.81, SD = .70) compared to the 
recruitment period (M = 4.54, SD = .56). Possible explanations for these findings will be 
considered in the general discussion. 
Next, differences in the proposed mediating variables between conditions were 
examined. There was a marginally significant difference in self-alienation between 
conditions (t(114) = -1.983, p = .050, 95% CI [-1.070, -.000], d = .37). Participants in the 
free will intervention reported greater self-alienation (M = 3.09, SD = 1.41) compared to 
participants in the control condition (M = 2.55, SD = 1.49). There was not a significant 
difference with reports of self-control (t(114) = .570, p = .570, 95% CI [-.256, .463], d = 
.11) or agency (t(114) = -1.400, p = .164, 95% CI [-.402, .069], d = .27). Participants 
reported similar levels of self-control (M = 4.12, SD = .91) and agency (M = 5.20, SD = 
.68) in the free will intervention condition and the control condition (M = 4.23, SD = 
1.04, for self-control; M = 5.03, SD = .60, for agency).  
An independent samples t-test examined differences in prosocial intentions to 
donate money, prosocial intentions to help, and hours willing to volunteer on service 
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projects in the short-term. There were no significant differences in prosocial intentions to 
donate money (t(114) = -.501, p = .618, 95% CI [-5.907, 3.524], d = .09) or prosocial 
intentions to help (t(114) = -1.142, p = .256, 95% CI [-.647, .174], d = .22). Participants 
reported similar levels of prosocial intentions in the free will intervention condition (M = 
23.71, SD = 12.41, for donations; M = 4.80, SD = 1.09, for help) and the control 
condition (M = 22.52, SD = 13.18, for donations; M = 4.56, SD = 1.13, for help). There 
were significant differences in hours willing to volunteer on service projects in the short-
term (t(24) = -2.824, p = .009, 95% CI [-8.917, -1.389], d = 1.15). Participants who 
completed the free will intervention reported more hours willing to volunteer (M = 9.82, 
SD = 3.74) compared to the control group (M = 4.67, SD = 5.12). These results should be 
interpreted with caution due to the small sample size. It is important to note that a 
measure of long-term prosocial behavior was also collected. Unfortunately, due to the 
small response rate (N = 3), analyses were not conducted. 
Finally, similar analyses were conducted on the exploratory measures of 
conformity, gratitude, and moral identity internalization. There were no significant 
differences in conformity (t(113) = .167, p = .868, 95% CI [-.221, .262], d = .03), 
gratitude (t(113) = .310, p = .757, 95% CI [-.310, .425], d = .14), or moral identity 
evaluations (t(113) = -.751, p = .454, 95% CI [-.248, .112], d = .06). Participants in the 
free will intervention group report similar levels of conformity (M = 3.76, SD = .65), 
gratitude (M = 5.44, SD = .96), and moral identity internalization (M = 5.50, SD = .52) 
compared to participants in the control condition (M = 3.78, SD = .65, for conformity; M 
= 5.50, SD = 1.02, for gratitude; M = 5.43, SD = .45, for moral identity internalization). 
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Correlations  
Although there were no significant differences across condition for the mediators 
and dependent measures, correlational analyses were conducted to examine the 
relationship between free will beliefs and all the dependent measures. Across conditions, 
there were significant positive relationships between free will beliefs and self-control 
(r(114) = .192, p = .039), agency (r(114) = .274, p = .003), gratitude (r(113) = .213, p = 
.023), and moral identity internalization (r(113) = .218, p = .002). Unexpectedly, there 
were no significant correlations between free will beliefs and any of the prosociality 
measures. See Table 3 for all correlations. 
 
Table 3. Bivariate correlations among variables in Study 2 across conditions. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Free Will -          
2. Self-Alienation .112 -         
3. Self-Control  .192* -.315** -        
4. Agency   .274** -.222* .312** -       
5. Intentions to Donate -.111 -.130 .150 .123 -      
6. Intentions to Help -.088 -.162† .134 .108 .730** -     
7. Volunteer Hours -.291 .098 .104 -.265 .352† .250 -    
8. Conformity .057 .211* -.252** -.151 -.118 -.050 -.156 -   
9. Gratitude .213* -.482** .167† .380** .225* .284** -.193 -.106 -  
10. Moral Internalization   .281** -.256** .141 .276** .116 .202* -.226 -.050 .421** - 
Note. †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01 
 
Mediation  
To examine whether differences in prosociality and the exploratory measures of 
conformity, gratitude, moral identity internalization between conditions were driven by 
self-alienation, the same meditational analysis was conducted as the previous studies. 
The bootstrapping analysis found that the 95% CI for the indirect effect contained zero, 
indicating that the indirect effect of the condition on prosocial intentions to donate [-
1.935, .219], prosocial intentions to help [-.212, .007], hours willing to volunteer on 
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service projects [-1.620, .840], and conformity [-.000, .139] through perceived self-
alienation was not significant. The indirect effect of condition on gratitude [-.400, -.018] 
and moral internalization [-.132, -.003] through perceived self-alienation was significant, 
suggesting that the difference in gratitude and moral identity internalization was a result 
of difference in perceptions of true self-knowledge.  
A meditational analysis was also conducted to examine the indirect effect of 
condition on each of the dependent measures through self-control and agency, 
respectively. The 95% CI for the indirect effect contained zero for each of these 
measures (95% CIs [-1.215, .519] for prosocial intentions to donate, [-.108, .042] for 
prosocial intentions to help, [-2.096, .209] for hours willing to volunteer, [-.046, .091] 
for conformity, [-.095, .059] for gratitude, [-.037, .026] for moral internalization, with 
self-control as a mediator; [-.205, 1.708] for prosocial intentions to donate, [-.028, .125] 
for prosocial intentions to help, [-.488, 1.774] for hours willing to volunteer, [-.091, 
.012] for conformity, [-.030, .276] for gratitude, [-.011, .103] for moral internalization, 
with agency as a mediator). Thus, the indirect effect of condition on each of the 
prosocial measures through perceived self-control and agency was not significant.  
Moderation  
To examine the influence of self-alienation and condition on all dependent 
measures, a hierarchical regression equation was computed. Self-alienation was 
standardized, the condition was dummy-coded (0 = control condition; 1 = free will 
intervention), and the product of these variables was used as the interaction term (Aiken 
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& West, 1993). Surprisingly, the self-alienation × free will condition interaction was not 
significant for any of the dependent measures (p’s > .420).  
 To examine whether self-control moderated the relationship between belief in 
free will and each of the dependent variables, a similar hierarchical regression was 
computed. The self-control × free will condition interaction was not significant for any 
of the dependent measures (p’s > .060) except for moral identity internalization (β = -
.182, p = .039; R2 change = .037). Simple slope analyses revealed that self-control 
significantly predicted moral identification internalization (β = .144, p = .012) in the 
control condition, but not in the free will intervention condition (β = -.039, p = .564). 
Participants with greater self-control in the control condition reported greater moral 
identification internalization compared to those with less self-control or in the free will 
intervention condition. See Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Moral identity internalization as a function of free will condition and self-
control in Study 2. Predicted values are plotted at ± 1 SD from the mean of self-control. 
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 Finally, hierarchical regressions were computed to examine whether agency 
moderated the relationship between belief in free will and each of dependent measures. 
The agency × free will condition interaction was not significant for any of the 
prosociality measures (p’s > .265). 
Overall, the first attempt at a free will intervention was not entirely successful in 
enhancing people’s existing free will beliefs or in influencing any of the proposed 
mediators and prosociality measures. More discussion about the first attempt to develop 
a free will intervention can be found in the general discussion. 
 
  
  
 
 
51 
CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 The present research examined true self-knowledge as a potential mechanism for 
the relationship between belief in free will and morally relevant outcomes. Specifically, 
this set of studies focused on prosociality as the primary outcome of interest. Study 1 
manipulated participants’ belief in free will, and Study 2 was an intervention study 
designed to enhance participants’ belief in free will over a short period of time. Across 
both studies, there was no evidence that true self-knowledge mediated or moderated the 
effect of belief in free will on prosocial emotions, intentions, and behavior.  
True Self Mediation and Moderation Model 
 The lack of evidence for a true self-knowledge mediation and moderation model 
in both studies can be attributed to several sources. First, participants in Study 1 reported 
lower group means for belief in free will compared to similar samples from previous 
studies involving manipulations of free will. Further, as seen in Table 4, there is a 
greater disparity in the general belief in free will manipulation check item between high 
and low belief in free will conditions in previous studies compared to the difference 
observed between conditions in Study 1. This atypical pattern seen in the current 
research suggests that the free will manipulation may not have been as effective in 
lowering and amplifying free will beliefs. As such, there were no significant differences 
in self-alienation or any of the prosocial measures as expected.  
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Table 4. Belief in free will and self-alienation descriptives in comparison to previous samples 
 Study 1 (N = 199) 
Study 2 
(N = 115) 
Previous Study 1 
(N = 212) 
Previous Study 2 
(N = 124) 
General FWB 5.13 (1.51) 4.64 (1.43) 5.33 (1.26) 5.23 (1.49) 
 High FWB: 5.35 (1.49) FW Intervention: 4.95 (1.39) High FWB: 5.66 (1.09) High FWB: 5.73 (1.26) 
 Low FWB: 4.89 (1.51) Control: 4.37 (1.41) Low FWB: 5.00 (1.34) Low FWB: 4.70 (1.53) 
FAD-Plus  4.80 (.79)   
  FW Intervention: 4.78 (.88)   
  Control: 4.81 (.70)   
Self-Alienation 2.41 (1.44) 2.81 (1.47) 2.63 (1.38) 2.43 (1.22) 
 High FWB: 2.30 (1.35) FW Intervention: 3.09 (1.41) High FWB: 2.50 (1.33) High FWB: 2.22 (1.08) 
 Low FWB: 2.54 (1.53) Control: 2.55 (1.49) Low FWB: 2.78 (1.42) Low FWB: 2.64 (1.32) 
Note. General FWB refers to the manipulation check item. 
 
 Additionally, in Study 2, we aimed to boost participants’ belief in free will in an 
effort to increase feelings of true self-knowledge and subsequently enhance prosocial 
emotions, intentions, and behaviors towards individuals in need. For this design, only 
participants with low free will beliefs were recruited. It is possible that it is difficult to 
influence participants with generally, and perhaps chronically, low belief in free will. 
Moreover, the time period for the intervention was only for three days. If people have 
longstanding beliefs about free will and determinism, recalling one specific instance 
where they experienced free will may not be effective in altering their existing 
worldviews. Given that researchers have successfully manipulated free will beliefs in a 
single experimental setting, it could be the case that belief in free will is more malleable 
in the moment versus the short-term or long-term.  
In a similar vein, the intervention in Study 2 involved a free will condition and a 
control condition. Prior research involving manipulations of free will has shown that 
belief in free will and control conditions yield similar statistical findings (see Baumeister 
et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008), and decreasing belief in free will is what is pivotal 
in explaining changes in social behavior. The lack of statistically significant differences 
across the main outcome and exploratory variables can be explained in part by the use of 
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two very similar conditions. It is plausible that a better test of the intervention would 
have been to employ a free will condition and determinism condition.  
Study 2 also yielded some unexpected patterns in self-alienation. Participants in 
the free will intervention group reported greater self-alienation than participants in the 
control condition, suggesting they feel less in touch with themselves after thinking about 
previous experiences with free will. Since participants with low free will beliefs were 
recruited for the intervention, it is plausible that the manipulation might have challenged 
their existing perceptions about free will, thereby leading to increasing feelings of self-
doubt. In other words, asking participants with low belief in free will to describe in vivid 
detail experiences where they experienced free will may have unintentionally decreased 
certainty about who they really are. 
Finally, it is possible that the measures of prosociality developed for these two 
studies are not the strongest measures of helpfulness. In designing the measures of 
prosocial emotions, intentions, and behavior, the aim was to develop a helping paradigm 
personally relevant to the participant sample. Perhaps, a more well-validated helping 
measure such as the “Katie Banks” helping paradigm (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; 
Baumeister et al., 2009; Maner et al., 2002), in which students could volunteer to help a 
fellow college student whose parents recently passed away, would have been more 
effective.  
  Although there was no direct evidence for the proposed mediation and 
moderation model in the current research, the results from these studies do lend some 
support for the main hypothesis. In Study 1, greater belief in free will was associated 
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with reduced feelings of self-alienation and greater prosocial emotions of compassion 
and empathy, and prosocial intentions to help others across conditions. Greater self-
alienation was also associated with fewer feelings of compassion, empathy, and 
prosocial intentions to help others. The interrelatedness of these variables suggest that a 
stronger study design should be used to properly test the mediating or moderating effects 
of true self-knowledge (e.g., stronger free will manipulation, different helping 
paradigm). It is important to note that belief in free will was not associated with self-
alienation or any of the prosociality measures nor was self-alienation associated with any 
of the prosociality measures in Study 2. However, Study 2 only recruited participants 
with low free will beliefs, potentially contributing to statistical issues of restrictions of 
range. Thus, if there was more variability in belief in free will in Study 2, perhaps 
similar relationships as Study 1 might have emerged.  
Alternative Mediation and Moderation Models 
Both studies also assessed two other potential mediators/moderators that have 
been implicated in previous research linking belief in free will to morally relevant 
behaviors: personal agency and self-control. In Study 1, personal agency was a 
significant mediator for the effect of condition on prosocial emotions and intentions. 
Previous research has found a direct relationship between belief in free will and agency 
(Aarts & van den Bos, 2011; Lynn et al., 2014), and other researchers have argued that 
belief in free will incites feelings of agency that influence social behavior (Alquist et al., 
2011; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Agency has typically been understood as an essential 
facet of belief in free will. After all, lay conceptualizations of free will often involve 
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people’s sense of control over their actions (Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Mele, 2006; 
Monroe et al., 2014; Stillman & Baumeister, 2010). Perhaps, it is the feeling that one can 
indeed control certain outcomes in life above feeling in touch with one’s true, moral self 
is what drives people to engage in positive moral behaviors. 
Study 1 also found that self-control moderated the effect of condition on 
prosocial emotions. Researchers have argued that mood regulation often requires self-
control (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). As mentioned previously, it is possible that 
experiencing prosocial emotions involves overriding the dominant response to think 
about one’s self. Self-control may allow people to become more other-focused than self-
focused. In this case, self-control enabled participants experiencing low belief in free 
will to feel more prosocial emotions towards others. This pattern was unexpected as 
evidence from previous research on disbelief in free will and helpfulness (Baumeister et 
al., 2009) would suggest that participants experiencing low belief in free will would be 
less prosocial towards others. It may be the case that participants with high self-control 
in the low belief in free will condition experience greater moral responsibility to care 
about others in need precisely because they feel people have limited ability to determine 
their own outcomes in life. Of course, this explanation is speculative, and these findings 
should be replicated before conclusions can be drawn. 
In Study 2, self-alienation emerged as a significant mediator for two exploratory 
variables: gratitude and moral identity internalization. These results suggest that belief in 
free will led people to feel more certain about who they are which subsequently allowed 
them to experience more gratitude and value their moral identity. It is possible that true 
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self-knowledge provides a foundation to understanding what is important to a person. As 
such, the experience of knowing who you are allows you to better appreciate the 
meaningful actions of others. Similarly, knowing one’s true self perhaps makes people 
feel more connected to their sense of moral goodness. After all, research suggests that 
people perceive the true self as a moral self (Nichols et al., 2015; Strohminger & 
Nichols, 2014). Thus, feeling in touch with who you are makes you readily identify with 
positive moral characteristics.  
Self-control also moderated the effect of condition on moral identity 
internalization in Study 2. Participants reporting higher self-control reported greater 
moral identity internalization in the control condition compared to participants reporting 
less self-control and those in the free will intervention condition. Although this pattern 
was unexpected, self-control involves effortful exertion over natural or desired behaviors 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). 
Those who are better able to engage in self-control are more likely to value higher moral 
character, as it may require a great sense of volition to maintain a sense of moral 
responsibility for oneself and for others. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although the set of current studies did not find support for the hypothesis that 
true self-knowledge would mediate or moderate the relationship between belief in free 
will and prosociality, there are many avenues for future research. First, if belief in free 
will is pivotal in promoting moral responsibility (Clark et al., 2014; Paulhus & Carey, 
2013; Shariff et al., 2014), the mechanism underlying this relationship still needs to be 
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identified. In Study 1, there is evidence that personal agency, not true self-knowledge, 
may play a crucial role in this relationship. Future research should aim to directly and 
conceptually replicate this effect. Once the mechanism has been identified, researchers 
can develop a free will model to predict social behaviors that benefit society at large.  
Additionally, both studies found largely null effects for the prosociality 
measures. As mentioned earlier, the measures of prosocial emotions, intentions, and 
behaviors were tailored towards the specific participant sample. Future research should 
use a more well-validated helping paradigm (e.g., helping college student, “Katie 
Banks”; Batson et al., 1997) to determine if the specific measures of helpfulness used in 
the current research is responsible for the null findings. It is important to note that 
prosociality was chosen as the primary outcome variable because previous research has 
found that disbelief in free will reduces helpfulness (Baumeister et al., 2009). If future 
research is unable to replicate this effect, then researchers need to reconsider whether 
manipulating free will beliefs influences actually influences prosocial intentions. It is 
possible that the observed correlations between belief in free will and many of the 
prosocial measures are spurious relationships. Alternatively, it may be the case that a 
specific facet of free will, rather than general belief in free will, is driving moral 
behavior. (See below for more discussion on this possibility).  
Although the intervention aimed to augment people’s belief in free will was not 
successful, future research should continue to develop a stronger free will intervention. 
To this researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study designed to enhance people’s free 
will beliefs. In developing a new intervention, it is important to consider the boundary 
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conditions for inducing changes in free will beliefs. For instance, bolstering free will 
beliefs may only be possible for people who already endorse belief in free will or for 
people who consider themselves compatibilists (i.e., those endorsing both free will and 
deterministic beliefs; Bergner & Ramon, 2013). In Study 2, only participants who 
reported low free will beliefs were recruited. It may be difficult to change people who 
have a deeply ingrained worldview.  
In a similar vein, an alternative perspective to consider is the particular time 
period of the intervention. Participants in Study 2 were all college students, presumably 
with a developed understanding of causality. Perhaps, a free will intervention would be 
more appropriate at an earlier stage in life where they are still exploring their own 
understanding of the world. For instance, researchers studying implicit theories of 
intelligence and personality have conducted interventions during adolescence, as this 
developmental period is often filled with changes in social roles, peer relationships, and 
other forms of adversity (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Yeager, Johnson, 
Spitzer, Trzesniewski, Powers, & Dweck, 2014; Yeager, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2013). 
They contend that adolescence is an ideal transitional period to intervene on implicit 
beliefs since people are often facing unique challenges in self-understanding. Perhaps, a 
specific development period such as adolescence to young adulthood would be more 
fruitful for a motivational free will intervention. 
Moreover, while the current intervention utilized a brief writing paradigm, future 
research might consider a new intervention design. For instance, adapting an 
implementation intention paradigm in which participants are required to engage in small 
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acts of free will (e.g., decide on a healthy or unhealthy snack) may be more effective in 
changing free will beliefs. Research has shown that people believe they are able to 
change their personality by engaging in behavioral intentions (e.g., “If I feel stressed, 
then I will call my mom to talk about it” to increase emotional stability; Hudson & 
Fraley, 2015). Perhaps, the daily experiences of free will can strengthen people’s 
perception that free will exists. 
It is important to note that an interesting pattern emerged in Study 2, in which 
participants across both conditions reported greater free will beliefs after the three-day 
writing paradigm. While this pattern was unexpected, it might be the case that people’s 
belief in free will becomes generally stronger over time. Future research should explore 
how free will beliefs changes across time longitudinally and if there are profound 
differences between people with high baseline free will beliefs and people with low 
baseline free will beliefs. 
Finally, recent research has emerged calling into question whether belief in free 
will truly influences moral judgments and behavior. Monroe, Brady, and Malle (2017) 
found evidence suggesting that general free will beliefs do not influence moral behavior, 
judgments of blame, and punishment for wrongdoing. Furthermore, they found that 
people’s perception of choice in an agent’s actions dictates blame and punishment. 
While ample evidence suggests that belief in free will indeed influences morally relevant 
behavior (e.g. Baumeister et al., 2009; Mackenzie et al., 2014; Vohs & Schooler, 2008), 
future research should reassess whether threatening belief in free will or a person’s sense 
of choice is more critical to moral actions. Moreover, if choice capacity is in fact 
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influencing moral judgments and behavior, more research should be conducted to 
formally operationalize the definition of free will. It is important to distinguish whether 
free will is simply a matter of agentic choice or if there are other components of free will 
that are critical in influencing moral behaviors.  
Conclusion 
 The current research provides an initial investigation of the potential mechanism 
driving the effect of belief in free will on morally relevant behaviors. Although there was 
no direct evidence for true self-knowledge mediating or moderating the relationship 
between belief in free will and prosocial emotions, intentions, and behavior, this research 
highlights the need to identify potential mediators in the future. Importantly, this 
research was potentially the first study to develop an intervention aimed at augmenting 
people’s belief in free will. This preliminary study lays the foundation for considering 
different approaches to motivational interventions in future research. Overall, these set 
of studies contribute to the growing literature on how belief in free will influences moral 
action and provides directions for researchers interested in boosting people’s belief in 
free will to produce positive psychological outcomes and behaviors. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Free Will Manipulation (Seto & Hicks, 2016) 
High Belief in Free Will Manipulation 
 
Free will is defined as the ability to make our own choices and to determine our own 
outcomes. Most people believe in free will, and recent research supports this belief. For 
instance, even though some people still believe that their actions are greatly 
determined by outside influences (e.g., social pressures), behavioral economists at 
Stanford and Texas A&M University have published studies showing that most of our 
behavior is determined by personal choices (Baumeister et al., 2011).      
 
Below are some statements that reflect beliefs about free will. Please read each statement 
carefully and take a moment to think about why these statements are true based on your 
own experiences.  In the following pages, you will be asked to select a statement from 
the list below and write about how the selected statement is true based on your own 
experiences. You will be asked to complete this same task for a total of three different 
times.  To begin, please select 1 statement from the list below that has proven especially 
true in your life. 
 
m I demonstrate my free will every day when I make decisions. (1) 
m I take personal pride in good decisions I have made in the past because I know that, 
at the time, I had the freedom to and could have made a bad decision. (2) 
m I am able to override the genetic and environmental factors that sometimes influence 
my behavior. (3) 
m Avoiding temptation requires that I exert my free will. (4) 
m Ultimately people cannot blame their own actions on anything other than themselves. 
(5) 
m I have free will to control my actions and ultimately to control my destiny in life. (6) 
m People are responsible for their behaviors because they have free will to control their 
actions. (7) 
m Our actions and thoughts are not simply the result of prior experiences. (8) 
m By exerting their free will, people can and do overcome the negative effects of a 
dysfunctional environment. (9) 
m Given that I have had personal experiences that science cannot explain, I also know 
that I have free will even if science cannot explain it. (10) 
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This is one [another] statement about free will that you selected as being true based 
on your own experiences:  
 
In the space below, please take a few minutes to describe how this statement about free 
will is true based on one of your personal experiences. Think about one specific example 
from your life and provide as much detail as possible.
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Low Belief in Free Will Condition 
 
Free will is defined as the ability to make our own choices and to determine our own 
outcomes. Most people do not believe our behavior is completely determined by free 
will, and recent research supports this belief. For instance, many 
people believe that their actions are often determined by outside influences (e.g., social 
pressures). In fact, behavioral economists at Stanford and Texas A&M University have 
even published studies showing that most of our behavior is determined by situational 
factors (Baumeister et al., 2011).     
 
Below are some statements that reflect beliefs about free will. Please read each statement 
carefully and take a moment to think about why these statements are false based on your 
own experiences (e.g., when an outside factor influenced your behavior).  In the 
following pages, you will be asked to select a statement from the list below and write 
about how the selected statement is false based on your own experiences. You will be 
asked to complete this same task for a total of three different times.  To begin, please 
select 1 statement from the list below that has proven especially false in your life. 
 
m I demonstrate my free will every day when I make decisions. (1) 
m I take personal pride in good decisions I have made in the past because I know that, 
at the time, I had the freedom to and could have made a bad decision. (2) 
m I am able to override the genetic and environmental factors that sometimes influence 
my behavior. (3) 
m Avoiding temptation requires that I exert my free will. (4) 
m Ultimately people cannot blame their own actions on anything other than themselves. 
(5) 
m I have free will to control my actions and ultimately to control my destiny in life. (6) 
m People are responsible for their behaviors because they have free will to control their 
actions. (7) 
m Our actions and thoughts are not simply the result of prior experiences. (8) 
m By exerting their free will, people can and do overcome the negative effects of a 
dysfunctional environment. (9) 
m Given that I have had personal experiences that science cannot explain, I also know 
that I have free will even if science cannot explain it. (10) 
 
This is one [another] statement about free will that you selected as being false based on 
your own experiences:    
 
In the space below, please take a few minutes to describe how this statement about free 
will is false based on one of your personal experiences. Think about one specific 
example from your life and provide as much detail as possible. 
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General Belief in Free Will, Item 1 (FAD-Plus; Paulhus & Carey, 2011) 
Personal Belief in Free Will, Item 2 (Belief in Free Will; Rakos, Laurene, Skala, & 
Slane, 2008) 
 
Manipulation Check 
 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements using the scale 
provided. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neither 
Disagree 
or Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. People have complete free will.  
2. I have complete free will. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Self-Alienation Subscale (Authenticity Inventory; Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, 
& Joseph, 2008) 
 
Please indicate how well each of the following statements describes you on the 
following scale. 
 
Does not 
describe 
me at all 
  Somewhat 
descriptive 
of me 
  Describes 
me very 
well 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I don't know how I really feel inside.  
2. I feel as if I don't know myself very well.  
3. I feel out of touch with the "real me."  
4. I feel alienated from myself.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
Prosocial Intentions (Gaesser & Schacter, 2014) 
 
How likely would you be to help in this situation? 
 
Not at all   Moderately 
Willing 
  Very 
Willing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. This person just finished eating at a restaurant and is feeling ill.  
2. This flower delivery person, who usually uses their own car for deliveries, finds out their 
car was stolen the day before Valentine’s Day.   
3. In the city, a bike was just stolen from this person, even though it was locked.  
4. This person's dog has not returned home in the last 24 hours. 
5. Even after attempting to make friends, this person has been sitting alone in the dining 
hall during meals for the last week. 
6. This person is suffering from dementia and is lost in a mall 
7. This person’s friend bailed on them after saying they would help them move their 
furniture into their new apartment.  
8. After coming home from work, this person discovered their apartment has a rat problem.  
9. This person was stung by a bee; their hand hurts and is swelling up.  
10. This new driver wrecked their parents’ car in a snowstorm.  
11. After returning from the beach, this person realized they're missing the watch their 
grandfather gave them. 
12. This person doesn’t have money for a ticket and is about to miss the last commuter rail 
of the day home.  
13. An earthquake just struck this person’s town, and several buildings have suffered severe 
damage.  
14. This person's neighbor accidentally shot off fireworks into their garage, which may catch 
on fire. 
15. This person's child is a weak swimmer, and is struggling to swim back to shore. 
16. The red cross is having a blood drive, and this person is working hard to get people to 
participate, but everyone is passing them by. 
17. This person is locked out of their house. 
18. Normally this person would deliver meals to the elderly, but they can't make their 
deliveries tonight.  
19. During an argument, this person's housemate began breaking things. 
20. The date is approaching for this person’s birthday party, but it is looking like most 
people won’t be able to make it.  
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21. This person ate some food that caused them to have a strong allergic reaction. 
22. Driving to their wedding, this person’s car broke down on the highway. 
23. This person just received a call informing them that their brother has been in a serious 
car crash. 
24. After organizing a fundraising dinner, this person became ill and cannot work in the 
kitchen.  
25. On the way home from school, this person just got into a car accident.   
26. While riding the train, this person is harassed by other passengers  
27. This person’s 8-year old child has been running a fever for several days. 
28. This person lost their voice the day they are supposed to run a charity auction. 
29. This person has just come home to find their apartment has been broken into.  
30. During a snowstorm, this person is sitting in a nearby airport when they find out their 
scheduled flight home for the holidays has been cancelled.  
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
Self-Control Scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004) 
 
Please indicate your agreement with following statements using the scale below. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neither 
Disagree 
or Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I have a hard time breaking bad habits. 
2. I get distracted easily. 
3. I say inappropriate things.  
4. I refuse things that are bad for me, even if they are fun.  
5. I’m good at resisting temptation. 
6. People would say that I have very strong self-discipline.   
7. Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work done.  
8. I do things that feel good in the moment but regret later on.  
9. Sometimes I can’t stop myself from doing something, even if I know it is wrong. 
10. I often act without thinking through all the alternatives. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
Involuntariness Subscale (Sense of Agency Rating Scale; Polito, Barnier, & Woody, 
2013) 
Please indicate your agreement with following statements using the scale below. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neither 
Disagree 
or Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I choose how to respond. 
2. My experiences and actions are under my control. 
3. I feel that my experiences and actions are not caused by me. (R) 
4. My experiences and actions feel self generated. 
5. My responses are involuntary. (R) 
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
Study 1 Helping Cover Story 
 
The Department of Psychology and Department of Economics are working with a new 
student organization on campus called, “Aggies Helping Texans.” Aggies Helping 
Texans is devoted to offering financial aid and other forms of assistance to people who 
have endured particularly difficult hardships. The student organization is providing 
philanthropy within the local Bryan/College Station community, and with enough 
support, hopes to develop a local initiative officially recognized by the cities of Bryan 
and College Station.   In order for Aggies Helping Texans to develop their local 
initiative, the cities of Bryan and College Station need an “impact report” detailing fiscal 
costs, staff maintenance, initiative sustainability, and quality of life estimates. The 
Department of Psychology is specifically assisting Aggies Helping Texans compose 
their impact report by collecting data on the interest and feasibility of their project.   This 
month Aggies Helping Texans is offering aid to three local members of the community. 
On the next few pages, you will find their short autobiographies. We would like you to 
evaluate each person’s autobiography on a variety of dimensions. Please be as honest as 
possible in your responses, as your responses will be used in the impact report to 
develop the local initiative. 
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
Autobiography 1: Howdy Aggies! My name is George Thompson, and I was recently 
in a car accident that left me with several physical injuries as well as extensive damages 
to my car. As you can imagine, it is pretty difficult to be mobile or active after such an 
experience. (I have difficulty just getting down the stairs of my house!) Not only has it 
been difficult to adjust to my daily life with these injuries, I have also been struggling to 
pay for my car repairs as well as my hospital bills. This car accident has been 
particularly strenuous on my life. 
 
Compassion:  
 
Not at All   Moderately   Very 
Much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I feel compassionate towards George and his situation. 
2. Imagine that George was someone who lived close to you. To what extent would you 
offer emotional support to George? 
 
Empathy: 
 
Not at All   Moderately   Very 
Much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I feel empathy towards George and his situation. 
2. To what extent does thinking about George and his situation make you feel sad or 
concerned? 
 
Prosocial Intentions to Donate: 
 
Imagine that you have $50.00. Would you keep the money for yourself or would you 
donate all or part of the money to help George with his current financial situation? 
Please indicate exactly how much of the $50.00 you would give to George.   
 
_____ How much of the $50.00 would you give to George? 
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Prosocial Intentions to Help:  
 
Not at All 
Willing 
  Moderately 
Willing 
  Very 
Much 
Willing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How likely would you help George in this situation? 
  
  
 
 
Autobiography 2: Howdy y'all! My name is Matt Taylor, and I have always had strong 
passion to end world hunger. I believe my lofty goal can begin right here in my local 
community, so I founded an organization in B/CS that delivers free meals to people in 
need. My organization has been pretty successful thus far, but at this moment, we are 
running low on financial resources. I have been unable to pay my drivers for their 
services, and as you might have guessed, making food deliveries is half the work. I am 
doing my best to keep my organization alive, but it has been a battle. 
 
Autobiography 3: Howdy everyone! My name is John Schwartz, and I teach math and 
science at a school in town. The school district I work for has made several budget cuts, 
and unfortunately, the students at my school are lacking basic necessities such as 
textbooks and other school supplies. I have been using a significant portion of my 
paycheck to make sure my students have the resources they need to complete their 
school work, but I do not make as much money as people in other professions. I wish I 
had more financial resources to help my students or the school district could do more to 
reallocate their funds.
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APPENDIX H 
 
 
Aggies Helping Texans is currently seeking volunteers to help their student organization, 
and they need individuals willing to provide assistance George, Matt, and John with their 
particular hardships. Below, you can read about how Aggies Helping Texans is 
providing assistance to these members of the B/CS community next week.       
 
If you’re interested in working with Aggies Helping Texans to provide aid to George, 
Matt, or John, please provide your email address under the name and description of the 
community member you would like to offer assistance to. Please enter your email for 
just one community member. You will be contacted by a member of Aggies Helping 
Texans within a few days for more details about the volunteering opportunity.      
 
You may also choose to opt out of volunteering for Aggies Helping Texans by simply 
clicking “next.”  
 
George: Because George has physical injuries from his car accident, he has had 
difficulty managing the upkeep of his home required by the “Home Owner's 
Association.” Aggies Helping Texans is looking for volunteers to help George do some 
yardwork at his house the following week. If you would like to volunteer to help George, 
please provide your email address below. 
 
You indicated that you would volunteer to help George next week. How many 
hours would you be willing to help George with his yardwork? 
 
______ How many hours can you help George next week?  
 
Matt: Matt is in need of volunteer drivers to help him deliver free meals to people 
around the community. Aggies Helping Texans is looking for volunteers to help Matt 
deliver meals to community members next week. If you would like to volunteer to help 
Matt, please provide your email address below. 
 
You indicated that you would volunteer to help Matt next week. How many 
hours would you be willing to help Matt with food deliveries? 
 
______ How many hours can you help Matt next week?  
 
John: To help raise funds for students at his school, John is organizing a fundraiser 
phone bank next week. Aggies Helping Texans is looking for volunteers to help John 
make calls to local businesses asking for donations. If you would like to volunteer to 
help John, please provide your email address below.   
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You indicated that you would volunteer to help John next week. How many 
hours would you be willing to help John with fundraiser calls? 
 
______ How many hours can you help John next week?
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
Aggies Helping Texans Email and Volunteer Confirmation 
Howdy Fellow Aggie! 
 
Thank you for volunteering to help a local member of the B/CS community next week 
with Aggies Helping Texans. We are currently in the process of organizing the volunteer 
schedule for the project. Below is a link to a survey where you can indicate the exact 
days and times of your availability. If you're unavailable to volunteer next week, we will 
have another volunteer opportunity the following week. The survey will also include 
days for this alternative volunteer project if this works better with your schedule. 
 
Please try to get back to us within a week with your response. Thank you for your time 
and consideration! 
 
-Aggies Helping Texans 
Follow this link to the Survey: 
Take the survey 
Follow the link to opt out of future emails: 
Click here to unsubscribe 
 
 
Thank you for volunteering to help one of the local B/CS community members with 
Aggies Helping Texans next week! In order to make proper arrangements for this 
volunteer project, please select the day(s) you are available to volunteer and indicate in 
the text box the specific times of your availability. Our organization will be in touch 
with you about the details of the project as soon as we organize our schedule. 
 
m Monday, October 3 ____________________ 
m Tuesday, October 4 ____________________ 
m Wednesday, October 5 ____________________ 
m Thursday, October 6 ____________________ 
m Friday, October 7 ____________________ 
m Saturday, October 8 ____________________ 
m Sunday, October 9 ____________________ 
 
If you are unable to volunteer next week, Aggies Helping Texans will have another 
volunteer opportunity the following week. Please select the day(s) you are available to 
  
 
87 
volunteer for a new project and indicate in the text box the specific times of your 
availability. 
 
m Monday, October 10 ____________________ 
m Tuesday, October 11 ____________________ 
m Wednesday, October 12 ____________________ 
m Thursday, October 13 ____________________ 
m Friday, October 14 ____________________ 
m Saturday, October 15 ____________________ 
m Sunday, October 16 ____________________ 
 
If you are unable to volunteer during either of these weeks, please select the option 
below. 
m I cannot volunteer during this two-week period. 
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APPENDIX J 
 
 
Study 2 Intervention Cover Story and Intervention 
 
Memory Study: Thank you for your interest in participating in this study. This is a two-
part study of how people vividly recall different types of experiences in their lives. In 
this study, we are interested in the relationship between memory processes and 
personality.  
 
Free Will Intervention 
 
People often self-report that they are able to vividly recall many types of experiences in 
their lives. For instance, many people vividly remember significant events during their 
lifetime such as walking across the stage at a graduation or starting their first day at a 
new job. Surprisingly, it is unclear how people’s memory works for everyday behaviors. 
We are not sure if there is a bias in responding or if people simply do not pay as much 
attention to their everyday experiences.    
 
In this study, we are interested in learning about vivid memories of people’s everyday 
experiences. For the next few days (including today), you will receive a writing prompt 
asking you to describe your memory of a particular experience. Please take the time to 
think about the prompt and then describe the particular experience, providing as much 
visual and perceptual detail as possible. Please try to write about 1 page and be as clear 
as possible in your writing.   
 
Day 1 Free Will Writing Prompt: Please describe a time you demonstrated your 
free will to make a decision.   
 
For today’s writing assignment, you will write about a time when you have 
demonstrated your free will to make a decision. Please provide a specific, 
concrete example. Don’t worry about spelling or grammar; just really “get into” 
the task and provide as much vivid detail as possible. We do ask that you try to 
write about 1 page and be as clear as possible in your writing. 
 
Day 2 Free Will Writing Prompt: Please describe a time you were able to 
override the genetic and environmental factors that sometimes influence your 
behavior.    
 
For today’s writing assignment, you will write about a time when you overcame 
genetic and environmental factors that influenced your behavior. Please provide a 
specific, concrete example. Don’t worry about spelling or grammar; just really 
“get into” the task and provide as much vivid detail as possible. We ask that you 
please try to write about 1 page. 
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Day 3 Free Will Writing Prompt: Please describe a time you were able to avoid 
temptation using your free will.    
 
For today’s writing assignment, you will write about a time when you used your 
free will to avoid temptation. Please provide a specific, concrete example. Don’t 
worry about spelling or grammar; just really “get into” the task and provide as 
much vivid detail as possible. We do ask that you try to write about 1 page and 
be as clear as possible in your writing. 
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Control Condition 
 
People often self-report that they are able to vividly recall many types of experiences in 
their lives. For instance, many people vividly remember significant events during their 
lifetime such as walking across the stage at a graduation or starting their first day at a 
new job. Surprisingly, it is unclear how people’s memory works for everyday behaviors. 
We are not sure if there is a bias in responding or if people simply do not pay as much 
attention to their everyday experiences.    
 
In this study, we are interested in learning about vivid memories of people’s everyday 
experiences. For the next few days (including today), you will receive a writing prompt 
asking you to describe your memory of a particular experience. Please take the time to 
think about the prompt and then describe the particular experience, providing as much 
visual and perceptual detail as possible. Please try to write about 1 page and be as clear 
as possible in your writing.   
 
Day 1 Control Writing Prompt: Please describe a typical walking route you take 
from one class to the next.               
 
For today’s writing assignment, you will write about a typical walking route to 
one of your classes on campus. Please provide a specific, concrete example. 
Don’t worry about spelling or grammar; just really “get into” the task and 
provide as much vivid detail as possible. We ask that you please try to write 
about 1 page. 
 
Day 2 Control Writing Prompt: Please describe the last time you drove in a car 
for more than 1 hour.    
 
For today’s writing assignment, you will write about a car trip that lasted more 
than 1 hour. Please provide a specific, concrete example. Don’t worry about 
spelling or grammar; just really “get into” the task and provide as much vivid 
detail as possible. We ask that you please try to write about 1 page. 
 
Day 3 Control Writing Prompt: Please describe the last movie you saw in the 
theater.    
 
For today’s writing assignment, you will write about the last movie you saw in 
theaters. Please provide a specific, concrete example. Don’t worry about spelling 
or grammar; just really “get into” the task and provide as much vivid detail as 
possible. We do ask that you try to write about 1 page and be as clear as possible 
in your writing. 
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APPENDIX K 
 
 
Study 2 Helping Cover Story 
 
For this next part of the study, our research lab is working on a special project for the 
Psychology Department and Economics Department at Texas A&M. In short, we're 
interested in gathering some data on college students' perspectives on service or 
philanthropy projects around the B/CS community.  
 
The Department of Psychology and Department of Economics are interested in assessing 
philanthropy initiatives within the local Bryan/College Station community. They are 
developing an “impact report” detailing fiscal costs, staff maintenance, initiative 
sustainability, and quality of life estimates. To develop their impact report, the 
Department of Psychology is specifically collecting data on the interest and feasibility of 
various projects.   On the next few pages, you will find short autobiographies of three 
local members of the B/CS community. These individuals, among others, are part of 
service projects that local philanthropy organizations are personally assisting with. We 
would like you to evaluate each person’s autobiography on a variety of dimensions. 
These evaluations will help the departments determine what types of philanthropy 
initiatives draw the most interest. Please be as honest as possible in your responses, as 
your responses will be used in the impact report. 
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APPENDIX L 
 
 
Study 2 Short-Term Helping Behavior 
 
Thank you for evaluating some of the autobiographies! They will be helpful in assisting 
the Psychology and Economics Departments develop an impact report about 
philanthropy initiatives.        
 
George, Matt, John, and many others are part of service projects that local philanthropy 
organizations are currently assisting with.  These local organizations are currently 
seeking volunteers for their service projects. There are many opportunities to volunteer 
in the B/CS community with these local philanthropy organizations in the coming 
weeks. If you're interested in volunteering to help some of our community members, 
please provide your email address below.  Note: They will have a wide variety of 
options for you to choose from (e.g., helping with fundraisers, delivering meals, etc.). If 
you decide to volunteer, a member of the organization will contact you with more details 
about a volunteering opportunity when one arises.     
 
You may also choose to opt out of volunteering by simply clicking “next.” 
 
Email: Please provide your email below if you're interested in volunteering on service 
projects for people in the B/CS community. 
 
Hours: You indicated that you would be willing to volunteer for service projects around 
the B/CS community. How many hours would you be willing to volunteer for during this 
semester? 
m 0 hours  
m 1 hour  
m 2 hours  
m 3 hours  
m 4 hours  
m 5 hours  
m 6 hours  
m 7 hours  
m 8 hours  
m 9 hours  
m 10 hours  
m 11 hours  
m 12 hours  
m 13 hours  
m 14 hours  
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m 15 hours  
m 16 hours  
m 17 hours  
m 18 hours  
m 19 hours 
m 20 hours  
  
 
94 
APPENDIX M 
 
 
Study 2 Long-Term Prosocial Behavior 
 
Several weeks ago, you completed a survey on behalf of the Psychology and Economics 
Departments about your perspectives on philanthropy projects in the B/CS community. 
When you completed the survey, you indicated an interest in volunteering to help your 
local B/CS community members. 
 
Donation Drive One of the local philanthropy organizations, “B/CS Cares,” is hosting a 
service project within the next couple of weeks in which volunteers will be asked to help 
with a food and clothing donation drive. If you are interested in this service opportunity, 
please indicate below how many hours you would be willing to volunteer for in the next 
three weeks. Based on your availability, a member of this organization will be in touch 
with you about the details of the project as soon as they organize their schedule. 
 
m 0 hours  
m 1 hour  
m 2 hours  
m 3 hours  
m 4 hours  
m 5 hours  
m 6 hours  
m 7 hours  
m 8 hours  
m 9 hours  
m 10 hours  
m 11 hours  
m 12 hours  
m 13 hours  
m 14 hours  
m 15 hours  
m 16 hours  
m 17 hours  
m 18 hours  
m 19 hours 
m 20 hours  
 
Fundraiser “One Community,” another philanthropy organization, is hosting a fundraiser 
in which they need volunteers to make phone calls to local businesses asking for 
donations on behalf of various B/CS community members. If you are interested in this 
service opportunity, please indicate below how many hours you would be willing to 
volunteer for in the next three weeks. Based on your availability, a member of this 
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organization will be in touch with you about the details of the project as soon as they 
organize their schedule. 
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APPENDIX N 
 
 
FAD-Plus: Free Will and Determinism Scale, Free Will Subscale is in italics 
(Paulhus & Carey, 2011) 
 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements using the scale 
provided. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neither 
Disagree 
or Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
1. I believe that the future has already been determined by fate. 
2. People’s biological makeup determines their talents and personality. 
3. Chance events seem to be the major cause of human history. 
4. People have complete control over the decisions they make. 
5. No matter how hard you try, you can’t change your destiny. 
6. Psychologists and psychiatrists will eventually figure out all human behavior. 
7. No one can predict what will happen in this world. 
8. People must take full responsibility for any bad choices they make. 
9. Fate already has a plan for everyone. 
10. Your genes determine your future. 
11. Life seems unpredictable—just like throwing dice or flipping a coin. 
12. People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to. 
13. Whatever will be, will be—there’s not much you can do about it. 
14. Science has shown how your past environment created your current intelligence and 
personality. 
15. People are unpredictable. 
16. Criminals are totally responsible for the bad things they do. 
17. Whether people like it or not, mysterious forces seem to move their lives. 
18. As with other animals, human behavior always follows the laws of nature. 
19. Life is hard to predict because it is almost totally random. 
20. Luck plays a big role in people’s lives. 
21. People have complete free will. 
22. Parents’ character will determine the character of their children. 
23. People are always at fault for their bad behavior. 
24. Childhood environment will determine your success as an adult. 
25. What happens to people is a matter of chance. 
26. Strength of mind can always overcome the body’s desires. 
27. People’s futures cannot be predicted.
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APPENDIX O 
 
 
Conformity Scale (Mehrabian & Stefl, 1995) 
 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements using the scale 
provided. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neither 
Disagree 
or Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I often rely on, and act upon, the advice of others. 
2. I would be the last one to change my opinion in a heated argument on a controversial 
topic. 
3. Generally, I’d rather give in and go along for the sake of peace than struggle to have 
my way. 
4. I tend to follow family tradition in making political decisions. 
5. Basically, my friends are the ones who decide what we do together. 
6. A charismatic and eloquent speaker can easily influence and change my ideas. 
7. I am more independent than conforming in my ways. 
8. If someone is very persuasive, I tend to change my opinion and go along with them. 
9. I don’t give in to others easily. 
10. I tend to rely on others when I have to make an important decision quickly. 
11. I prefer to make my own way in life rather than find a group I can follow.
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APPENDIX P 
 
 
The Gratitude Questionnaire (McCullogh, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002)  
 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements using the scale 
provided. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neither 
Disagree 
or Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. I have so much in life to be thankful for. 
2. If I had to list everything that I felt grateful for, it would be a very long list. 
3. When I look at the world, I don’t see much to be grateful for. 
4. I am grateful to a wide variety of people. 
5. As I get older I find myself more able to appreciate the people, events, and situations 
that have been part of my life history. 
6. Long amounts of time can go by before I feel grateful to something or someone. 
 
  
  
 
99 
APPENDIX Q 
 
 
Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) 
 
Listed below are some characteristics that may describe a person: 
 
Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Hardworking, Helpful, Honest, Kind 
 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements using the scale 
provided. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  Neither 
Disagree 
or Agree 
  Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Internalization 
1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.  
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am. 
3. I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics. 
4. Having these characteristics is not really important to me.  
5. I strongly desire to have these characteristics.
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APPENDIX R 
 
 
Probes and Demographics 
 
1. In your own words, what was the purpose of the experiment? 
 
2. Have you been in any other experiment that was similar to this experiment?  If YES, 
please describe. 
 
3. Please indicate your gender. 
Female (1) 
Female to Male Transgender (2) 
Male (3) 
Male to Female Transgender (4) 
Not Sure (5) 
Other (Please Specify): (6) ____________________ 
 
4. Please indicate your age. ______ 
 
5. What race best describes you? 
American Indian/Alaska Native (1) 
Asian (2) 
Indian (3) 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (4) 
White (5) 
Black or African-American (6) 
More than one race (7) 
Other (please specify) (8) ____________________ 
 
6. Are you Hispanic/Latino?  
Yes (1) 
No (2) 
 
7. Is English your native language? 
Yes (1) 
No (2) 
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8. Approximately how much total combined money did all members of your 
HOUSEHOLD earn last year? This includes money from jobs; net income from 
business, farm, or rent; pensions; dividends; interest; social security payments; and any 
other money income received by members of your HOUSEHOLD that are EIGHTEEN 
18 years of age or older. Please report the total amount of money earned - do not subtract 
the amount you paid in taxes or any deductions listed on your tax return. 
 
Less than $20,000 (1) 
$20,000 to $34, 999 (2) 
$35,000 to $49,999 (3) 
$50,000 to $74,999 (4) 
$75,000 to $ 99,999 (5) 
$100,000 to $149,999 (6) 
$150,000 or More (7) 
 
9. Please mark the point on the scale that best indicates your political orientation. 
 
 very 
liberal 
(1) 
liberal 
(2) 
slightly 
liberal 
(3) 
moderate 
(4) 
slightly 
conservative 
(5) 
conservative 
(6) 
very 
conservative 
(7) 
I 
am... 
(1) 
       
 
10. Please mark the point on the scale that best describes your political party preference. 
 
 Strong 
Democrat 
(1) 
Weak 
Democrat 
(2) 
Independent 
/ Lean 
Democrat 
(3) 
Independent 
(4) 
Independent 
/ Lean 
Republican 
(5) 
Weak 
Republican 
(6) 
Strong 
Republican 
(7) 
What is 
your 
political 
party 
preference? 
(1) 
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11.  Please indicate how religious you are using the following scale. 
 
 not 
religious 
at all (1) 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) very 
religious 
(7) 
How 
religious 
are you? 
(1) 
       
 
12. Which of the following best describes your religious beliefs? 
Jewish (1) 
Protestant (2) 
Hindu (3) 
Catholic (4) 
Buddhist (5) 
Muslim (6) 
Spiritual but Not Religious (7) 
Atheist/Agnostic (8) 
Other (please specify) (9) ____________________ 
 
13. On average, how often do you participate in volunteer activities or services to help 
your community? 
 
Not Often 
At All 
  Moderately 
Often 
  Extremely 
Often 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
14. How important is volunteering or giving back to the community to you? 
 
Not 
Important 
At All 
  Moderately 
Important 
  Extremely 
Important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
